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

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

I. I. MINKOV

The Leaders of the 2nd International, the U. S. S. R., and the United Front

IT is possible that among the members of the Paris Committee of the reformist General Confederation of Labor, who voted for the resolution of "protest" against the shooting of "100 workers" in the U.S.S.R., there were people who honestly imagined that "100 workers" really were shot. But even the people who allowed themselves to be misled by the others, by the conscious liars, about *the fact* itself, were to blame for raising their hands in favor of this counter-revolutionary resolution and for feeling hostility if not hatred towards the Soviet Union. On this occasion the reformist trade union leaders repeated all that they have stubbornly, systematically and consistently done and are continuing to do in connection with the great republic of workers and peasants since the day when it came into existence in the fire of the October Revolution, namely, they have made use of any excuse to make an onslaught on it, to besmirch it with lies, and to attempt to discredit it in the eyes of the workers.

Yes, after the foul murder of Sergei Kirov, the leader of the Leningrad proletariat, one of the most famous leaders of the Communist Party, the organs of the proletarian dictatorship, by sentence of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court, shot more than 100 counter-revolutionary terrorists. These were White-Guard bandits, every one of them, who had secretly crossed the Finnish, Latvian and Polish borders, sent to the Soviet Union by foreign terrorist organizations with the aid of governmental institutions in certain States, their task being to organize the murder of those who stand at the head of socialist construction. There was not a single worker among these criminals, defeated by the sword of revolutionary justice. They were all recruited from among former tsarist officers, from among the sons of the former land-owners and bourgeoisie, and the White-Guard crew rotting in emigration. But even had there been some among these hired terrorists engaged in preparing these counter-revolutionary murders who were "workers" by origin, degenerate lumpen proletarians who had sold themselves to the enemies of the proletariat, then, still, what would have been the meaning of the demonstrative display of "class" solidarity with these bandits by the reformist leaders?

LENIN AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES "FROM THE RANKS OF THE WORKERS"

Such "class" solidarity with counter-revolutionaries "from the ranks of the workers" is nothing new. In 1919 Comrade Lenin wrote an article in No. 5 of *The Communist International* entitled, "How the Bourgeoisie Makes Use of the Renegades" and exposed the real essence of this "argument". This is what Lenin wrote about the

crocodile tears which Kautsky shed over the "civil war among the proletariat":

> "A striking example will enable us to grasp the contemptible character of the argument. During the great French Revolution, a section of the French peasantry, the people of La Vandee, fought for the king against the republic. In June, 1849, and in May, 1871, there were workers among the troops of Cavaignac and of Gallifet respectively; there were workers among those who strangled the revolution. What would you say of a man who should declare—'I deplore the civil war between the French peasants in 1792', or 'I deplore the civil war between the French workers in 1849 and in 1871'? You would say that he was a hypocritical advocate of the reaction of the monarchy of Cavaignac.
>
> "And you would be right.
>
> "One who fails to understand that what is now happening in Russia, what is germinating everywhere, is the civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, must be little better than an idiot. There never has been and never will be a class struggle in which part of the advanced class failed and will fail to take the side of the reaction. The same thing is true of the civil war. Some of the more retrograde among the workers come to the aid of the bourgeoisie for a more or less short period of time. But only knaves will make use of this fact to justify their own desertion to the bourgeoisie."

This is what Lenin wrote in 1919.

And this irresistible argument of Lenin, so deadly for those who come forward in defense of those "workers" who shoot at the leaders of the proletarian revolution, deals a straight blow at the hypocritical "ouvrierists" (lovers of workers) from among the Paris reformist trade union committee.

And let them not attempt to dodge the issue by arguing that Lenin issued this sentence to such renegades during the period of the civil war, which is not in existence now. Yes, civil war and the first round of wars of intervention have long ago been put an end to on the territory of the Soviet Union by the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yes, the workers of the Soviet Republics and the collective farm peasantry have rooted out the capitalist classes and are solidly united around their Soviet Government, and are directing all their energies towards the gigantic construction of socialist society. But has the Soviet Union no enemies, who are preparing to undertake an attack against it? Are not their agents attempting to penetrate every chink, and to utilize all kinds of scum so as to undermine from within the proletarian State which they hate so much? And should not the proletarian government wipe out these scum who are working for a new war, so as to avoid an immeasurably greater number of victims?

Among the fourteen participants in the so-called "Leningrad Center" who were executed (this was the terrorist group which directly organized the assassination of Sergei Kirov, and was financed by the diplomatic agent of a foreign State), among the several tens

of participants in the Zinoviev "Moscow Center" who were sentenced to imprisonment and who led the Leningrad terrorists politically, there were, side by side with decayed petty-bourgeois elements, former workers as well, former members of the proletarian Party, who had foully betrayed it and taken to fascist methods of struggle, and who resorted to terror against the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, having passed into the service of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionaries engaged in preparing imperialist counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R.

They met with the merciless punishment meted out by the proletarian justice. And every trade union bureaucrat who raised his voice in their defense is defending in their persons, not "workers" but what fundamentally was masked White-Guard counter-revolutionary organization, composed of agents of fascism and instigators of war, and is defending people at whose instructions the terrorists fundamentally carried on their abominable work.

* * * * *

If the Paris reformist leaders found it advisable to cover up their defense of the White-Guard and other counter-revolutionary terrorists—and did not hesitate to make use of the most outrageous lies—by a hypocritical display of "love for the workers", then the leaders of international Social-Democracy of *all shades* did not seek for even this fig leaf behind which to carry on their wild slander of the Soviet Union.

The signal for the anti-Soviet bacchanalia in which all the leaders of the Second International, without exception, have taken part, was provided by the chairman of the International, the born enemy of the Soviet Union, Emil Vandervelde, who wrote an article entitled, "The Domination of Force—Socialism or the Relapse to Barbarism". Russian Mensheviks were drawn in as the main sources of "information", and they filled all the Social-Democratic papers, Right and "Left", with their "declarations" and articles.

VANDERVELDE'S "HUMANITARIANISM"

Vandervelde had the unheard of impudence to bedeck his article (of December 16, 1934) in defense of the assassin of Comrade Kirov with a portrait—of whom?—of Rosa Luxemburg, who was foully murdered by his mercenary party colleagues, Ebert and Noske. Vandervelde, the man who (in 1922) defended the Right S.R.'s who murdered Volodarsky and made an attempt on the life of Lenin, builds his case in defense of Kirov's assassin, "juridically" above all. He is "shaken" to the bottom of his soul by the fact that the case of the counter-revolutionary terrorists was dealt with by the Supreme Court behind "closed doors", as a result of which he, Vandervelde, was deprived of the possibility of checking the genuine nature of the evidence against the "accused"; his feeling of "fairness" (after the World War Vandervelde was the Belgian Minister of Justice and sent dozens of Flemish "activists" to jail) is horror-struck at this "complete negation of the elements of rights of the defense"; he is rendered speechless by the speed at which the trial was dealt with and especially

by the fact that the criminals who were sentenced to be shot were deprived of the "right" to appeal for pardon. However, the "humanitarian" Vandervelde, to whom every human life is dear, and whose heart trembles at the thought of every drop of blood that is shed, this very Vandervelde who was a Minister during the World War, and was "enticer-in-chief" of the Belgian soldiers on all fronts and was General Alexeyev's agitator during the offensive of June, 1917, a wild supporter of the imperialist war to its victorious conclusion, does not limit himself to this apparently "purely humane" "non-political" defense of the White-Guard terrorists. He supplements it by a direct political attack on the Soviet Union.

Vandervelde is "shocked" not only at the absence of "elementary rights, etc.", in the Bolshevik court—in the last analysis "the Bolsheviks remain equal to themselves", *i.e.*, they remain Bolsheviks and nothing else can be expected of them. He is still further shocked by something else. He is indignant at the fact that public opinion in France is not "shocked" to the same degree as he is, by the affront which Soviet justice has dealt the terrorists caught in the act, and explains this "dulling of moral sensitiveness" by the operation of the "Franco-Soviet alliance cordiale". Vandervelde goes still further. He is shameless enough to make a comparison between the improvement in the relation between France and the U.S.S.R., in the interests of preserving peace and against the ever sharper growing danger of a new world war, and the pre-war Franco-Russian alliance. France, he complains, "is just as little disturbed now by the internal policy of the Soviet Government, a friendly power if not an ally, as it was by the behavior of 'Father' Tsar Nicholas II, during the period of its alliance with Russia".

The foul nature of this onslaught does not consist in the fact that it is Vandervelde who commits it, the same Vandervelde who as Belgian Minister of War Supplies in the years 1914-17, was himself the direct ally of Nicholas II, and urged the Russian workers to reconcile themselves with their Tsar so that the allied armies might secure victory. It is not a question of Mr. Vandervelde's brazen face. The political essence of this attack made by Vandervelde, directed against the present rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and France in the sphere of foreign policy, and not against the most aggressive imperialism of fascist Germany, Japan, etc., engaged in provoking war, and particularly counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union, consists in the following: in *whose* interests, in the interests of *which* international policy is this attack being carried on? By making this attack, Vandervelde takes up his position on the side of the international policy of Hitlerite fascism, which openly preaches an imperialist alliance to carry through a counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union.

After all this, it is not surprising to see the apparent carelessness of the Brussels *Peuple* (Mr. Vandervelde's newspaper) regarding the sources from which it secures its information about the Soviet Union. The majority of the telegrams published in this paper during the period of the campaign of the most foul lies and slander against

the Soviet Union, which continued unceasingly for the two months following December 1, came from *Berlin.* So as to give an idea of the character of this information, we shall merely remark that on January 3, 1935, the *Peuple* printed a telegram from Berlin regarding the introduction of the sale of bread without cards; and gave it an *editorial* heading of the following nature:

> "Consumers in Moscow Demonstrate Against the High Price of Bread."

His colleagues from other parties come forward in unison with the leader of the Belgian Labor Party and chairman of the Second International. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress in Britain and the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party adopted a resolution on December 21, 1934, in which they stated that they were "profoundly shocked and alarmed by the reprisals which followed" the murder of Comrade Kirov. In harmony with this, the London *Daily Herald* carried on a wild anti-Soviet campaign from day to day after the fashion of its Brussels colleague.

On December 20, 1934, the Dutch *Het Volke* opened up an uninterrupted chain of attacks on the Soviet Union with an article entitled, "Bloodthirstiness". In this first article it hypocritically stands up for "the technical and also the mental revolution carried through under its (that of the Bolshevik dictatorship) leadership, and then places a sign of equality between the Hitlerite and Soviet "regime of terror". The Swedish and especially the Danish Social-Democratic press beat all records in this anti-Soviet campaign. They are not left far behind by the Social-Democratic press of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and even by the Social-Democratic press of Sofia which appears under the fascist censorship. The same "position" is taken up by the emigrant *Neue Vorwarts*, the organ of the German Social-Democrats, and by the Social-Democratic press in the United States. In New York things went to the extent of the leader of the Socialist Party speaking at a meeting organized by the Russian White-Guard monarchists against the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

At the session of the Executive Committee of the Second International held in the middle of November, there was a group of seven "Left" parties which issued a joint declaration in favor of united front on an international scale. Along with the parties which, under the pressure of the masses of the workers, were compelled to form a united front with the Communist Parties (France, Austria, Spain and Italy), this group also contained such parties as joined in this "demonstration" in favor of the international united front for "tactical" reasons, although at home they actually turn down the united front with the Communists (Switzerland and the Jewish "Bund" in Poland). Finally, the declaration of the "Lefts" was also graced by the signature of the representative of the Menshevik counter-revolutionary elements in emigration.

THE HYPOCRICY OF THE "LEFTS"

It is characteristic that after the events of December 1, the leaders of the "Left" parties affiliated to the Second International *fundamentally* took up the same position as that taken up by Vandervelde, the British Laborites, and the Swedes, etc., only in certain cases maintaining a certain decorum in form, but outdoing their openly Right colleagues in hypocrisy.

The official organ of the Austrian Socialists, who have a united front with the Communist Party, the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, published in Brun, was cunning enough not to utter a single word about the events in the Soviet Union during all the weeks and months that passed. Its editor, Otto Bauer, did not dare to explain his position in its columns for fear that the workers would be up in arms against him. But then Bauer expressed himself, and expressed himself in Otto Bauer fashion, in the *Kampf*, the unofficial theoretical organ which he edits and which does not circulate among the workers, *i.e.*, fundamentally he took up a position attacking the Soviet Union merely covering it up by a thick pattern of foul and well-intentioned phrases. "Of course", writes Bauer, "It is possible [!] that it may happen [!!] that the White-Guard plotters abroad still [!!] send those who carry out attempts at murder in the Soviet Union. . . ." But "the Soviet Government has replied to the assassination of Kirov by the mass execution of pople who apparently had no connection with the murderer of Kirov, and therefore cannot be justified by a real situation of enforced defense". Therefore, declares Bauer, and this statement exposes the whole counter-revolutionary character of his position, "the struggle against fascism loses its moral merit, if even where socialism is in power, it makes light of the principles of modern [!] justice when the bitter necessity of revolutionary defense does not compel it to do so. . . ." And Bauer concludes:

> "Such governmental terror renders it simply impossible for any person for whom socialism is the fulfillment of the highest values of mankind and humanity, to link up ideologically with Bolshevism, even if he has a very high estimate of the merits of Russian Bolshevism in constructing socialist economy, and the importance of these merits for the struggle of liberation of the world proletariat."

And so, apparently only one thing separates Bauer from Bolshevism, namely, "a light attitude to the principles of modern justice" on the part of the Soviet Government to the White-Guards, who "it is possible that it still happens" cross the Soviet border to carry out attempts of murder, but who have the right to demand that they be considered as the bearers of "the values of mankind and humanity". Therefore Bauer considers the Bolsheviks as "morally unworthy" of carrying on the fight against fascism, *i.e.*, fundamentally continues the old Social-Democratic policy, which under the guise of a "struggle on two fronts", against Communism and against fascism, cleared the way for fascism, a policy smashed to atoms by the course of events in Austria itself.

Bauer *hides* his position from the working class readers of the *Arbeiter Zeitung* who have honestly linked up with the united anti-fascist front with the Communists. Our Austrian comrades without a doubt will do everything possible to bring to the notice of the revolutionary working class Socialists in Austria this new maneuver of Bauer who loves to come before them as an "almost Bolshevik".

A more open anti-Soviet position is also adopted by the "Left" Nenni in the *Avanti*, the organ of the Italian Socialist Party, who impudently declares that he "very sharply condemns the action of the Soviet Government in the given conditions".

Ehrlich, the leader of the Jewish "Bund" in Poland aired his views in the "Bund" newspaper, the *Volkszeitung*, about the impossibility of justifying the events that took place in the U.S.S.R. after December 31, before "revolutionary morals" and "socialist honor".

The Zurich *Volksrecht*, the journal most widespread of all the papers belonging to the Swiss Social-Democrats, who also adhered to the "Left" bloc in the Second International, spreads the most shameless and filthy slander of the Soviet Union from issue to issue, and ladles out whole bucketsful of filth from the fascist cesspools.

Among the Menshevik products (the Mensheviks, as I have mentioned, also participated in the "Left" bloc) which fill the Social-Democratic papers in all languages and of all trends, we have to select just one. In a leading article printed in the German *Social-Democrat*, published in Prague, on December 29, R. Abramovich goes so far as to *openly justify the assassination of Comrade Kirov.* He expresses complete sympathy with the band of Zinovievite scum who, allegedly reduced to despair by "the lying policy of the leaders, determined to undertake terrorist acts" and adds: "And no doubt those who were reduced to despair were morally not the worst." We must bear in mind the direct "moral" justification by this Menshevik hack, of the scoundrel who shot from behind at one of the most honored builders of socialism in the Soviet Union, when characterizing the behavior recently of the central organ of the Socialist Party of France and its leader Leon Blum, in relation to the events in the U.S.S.R.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION

The editorial board of this paper published practically nothing in its own name. On December 7, Blum considered it necessary to declare the following in an article bearing his initials:

> "There is nothing to show that he (the murderer of Kirov) acted as a weapon of the enemies of the Soviet Government, and the most probable motive for his crime at the present time is personal vengeance or hatred. But if this is the case, then how can we explain the hasty sentences and the mass executions by means of which, it would seem, the Soviet Government wants to suppress the danger of 'terrorism'."

(Blum ironically puts the word terrorism in quotation marks,

—*Ed.*) Then Blum asks the Communists to allay his doubts or simply to give him some information.

This is all that Blum has written in his own name regarding the fundamentals of this question, for the whole period that has elapsed since December 1. This apparently "philistine" explanation of the "probable motives" for the dastardly counter-revolutionary crime, an explanation in reality directed towards the defense of the assassin, was rapidly refuted by the exhaustive information made available. The picture became blindingly clear. It was an enemy of the Soviet Government who fired the shot at one of the most prominent representatives of this Government, and he committed this act on instructions from an organized gang of counter-revolutionaries who were in direct contact with the official agent of a foreign State. Blum received the desired information but continued to keep silent in spite of this.

He did not, however, keep silent altogether. Blum broke his strange "neutrality" by printing vile "declarations" made by the Mensheviks in the columns of his paper, written in the style of the article of Abramovich, already mentioned, adding in his own name that "the most sincere and most loyal operation of the tactics of united front action cannot demand that the *Populaire* should refuse the hospitality of its columns to a party [!] which is linked to us by the fraternal ties of membership of one international and which has signed a declaration in favor of the united front together with others".

And so Blum, the boss of the *Populaire*, was not altogether silent. Cravenly hiding behind the back of the "White" Mensheviks, Blum expressed himself in the form best suiting his ends. He chose this Jesuit form for very clear reasons. He knew that the overwhelming majority of the proletariat, including the readers of his paper, are not "neutral", and that the workers, led by their class instinct, are heart and soul on the side of the proletarian dictatorship which mercilessly punishes those who dare lift their hands against it. Blum therefore preferred to utter the anti-Soviet filth which rouses the anger of the proletariat, not in his own name, but through his Menshevik customers.

Blum once invented the expression "the vacation of legality" as an elegant pseudonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat—a dictatorship short-lived, gentle, humane, and liberal. The workers understand things in a more simple manner. Under a proletarian government, it is not a question of "vacations" and short "holidays" of legality, but of the substitution for bourgeois, anti-proletarian counter-revolutionary legality, "democratic" or fascist, of proletarian, anti-bourgeois, revolutionary law and order which deals mercilessly and rapidly with the enemy. Blum or some one of his "humane" colleagues from the Second International once composed the following aphorism: "As long as prisons exist it is quite immaterial who of us sit in them." No, it is not immaterial to the workers. The workers prefer that the bourgeoisie, fascists, and counter-revolutionaries be imprisoned rather than that they themselves should be imprisoned.

No, Blum is not "neutral" on the question of his attitude towards the Soviet Union, towards the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and victorious socialism and what is more, he never was "neutral". Blum always was in complete solidarity on this question with Vandervelde and with the most inveterate enemies of the land of the Soviets, among the leaders of the Second International. He never broke off this solidarity.

Over a period of some decades, from the moment when the *Populaire* was founded, Blum day after day conducted a systematic, consistent and biased line of slander against the Soviet Union in this paper. He entrusted the foreign department of this paper to a Menshevik (the notorious Ronsenfeld) and when the workers protested against the scandalous escapades of this individual, Blum defended him, declaring the following: "Rosenfeld is myself, there is no Rosenfeld policy. There is only Blum's policy." When the White-Guard general Kutepov disappeared from Paris, Blum headed the campaign which accused the "Bolsheviks" of Kutepov's disappearance, and threatened the Soviet Embassy in Paris, on the Rue de Grennel, with the "indignation of the people" and pogroms.

Blum, as well as his colleagues among the leaders of the Second International, are not "neutral" as regards the Soviet Union. The French workers, especially the Socialist workers, should know and remember this.

* * * *

The I.L.P. *New Leader* also took up an infamous position. After a formal report on December 7 of the Kirov assassination, and complete silence for three weeks, it published on December 28 a "plea for the facts" since the Soviet authorities "will cause grave doubts if they continue the policy of executions following secret trials". This was followed by a leading article on January 4 which, apart from attempting to white-wash Trotsky, demanded a "public trial" of the White Guards and expressed "regret that recent events have seriously disturbed the minds of many Soviet sympathizers outside Russia". It is characteristic that the *New Leader* considered it politically necessary to advertize on January 18 an article by the counter-revolutionary Trotsky, and on January 25 an advertisement of Trotsky's foul counter-revolutionary pamphlet about the assassination of Kirov.

THE VOICE OF A SPANISH SOCIALIST

Only one person from among the prominent Socialists raised her voice against the howling chorus of the enemies of the U.S.S.R. This person, Marguerite Nelken, is a Spanish Socialist, a deputy to the Cortes.

She ends up her appeal, written in connection with the impending execution of twenty-six Asturian rebels, and addressed to "the proletarian parties, trade union organizations and anti-fascist organizations" with the following words:

> "I do not want to end up without first emphasizing with a bitterness which I cannot hide, how painful it is to see so much sympathy lavished on those in Russia who, after the

> murder of Kirov, were sentenced in defense of the Revolution, which every worker is obliged to defend and support, whatever his theoretical views may be. At the same time I wish to draw attention to the heavy silence reigning in connection with the death sentences [in Asturias—*Ed.*] dictated by the vengeance of the enemies of the proletarian class. I call upon all international and national organizations which represent the strivings of the toilers and the revolt of free conscience against fascist oppression, to honestly state whether the protests of indignation directed against the revolution which wants to defend itself—and woe to the revolution which could not defend itself! *whether these protests* would not be more appropriate, *from the logical and human point of view*, if they were directed against the counter-revolution which is preparing to cut short the life of twenty-six heroes!"

These simple and honest words uttered by this Spanish woman Socialist are a sharp slap in the face for all the leaders of the Second International, especially for those who play with "Left" phrases.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE TROTSKYITES

As regards the Trotskyites and Trotsky, they must henceforth be designated as a legitimate component part of the Second International.

Until recently, the Trotskyist groups in various countries of Europe, composed of the scum thrown out of the Communist Parties at different periods, for acts not always bearing a political character, and reinforced by open police agents (this has been proved in Greece, Poland and a number of other countries), attempted to depict themselves as a "Left" or "super-Left" opposition, as "sections" of the "Fourth International" which is coming into being. At that time already they enjoyed the open protection of a considerable section of the Social-Democratic leaders, who regarded them as convenient "allies", as special kinds of "experts" and "adepts" in the art of slandering the Communists and the Soviet Union. The bourgeoisie and secret police have always utilized the renegades in this way.

Five months ago, the French Trotskyites gave up their "independent" existence and merged with the Socialist Party, a section of the Second International, with the express purpose of working from within in a provocatory fashion, to disrupt the united front of the Communist and Socialist workers established as the result of the powerful pressure brought to bear by the proletarian masses. And a considerable section of the Socialist leaders who agreed to the united front under pressure of the masses and against their own will, welcomed the Trotskyites with open arms, knowing full well that they represent nil among the working class of France, and that their only value lies in their boundless fury against the Communists, and in their just as boundlessly unscrupulous methods of struggle against the Communists and the Soviet Union.

The enemies of the Soviet Union, of Communism and of the united front inside the French Socialist Party did not miscalculate

on their collaboration with the Trotskyites and with Trotsky himself. This collaboration was most glaringly displayed after the Leningrad events when it turned out that the gang which organized the murder of Kirov consisted of those who had been trained by the Zinoviev-Trotskyite bloc of 1926-27 led by Trotsky, and that this gang was financed by a foreign consul who, by the way, is a former Social-Democrat and Menshevik, and who offered his services in establishing direct contact with Trotsky. Trotsky tries to weaken the deadly character of these *facts* by attempting to undertake a "counter-offensive". Trotsky winks his eye, and with the foul smile of a born renegade-provocateur who appears in a counter-revolutionary court as an expert witness, who from his own experience knows "how things are done", tells his "version" of what took place. A consul? First of all there was no consul at all. He was invented by the "Chekists", by the Soviet Court. What people with a grain of sense will believe them? Secondly, this consul (steps have to be taken to insure oneself in case the existence of the consul and his role in preparing the Leningrad crime have been, so to speak, physically proved—which was actually the case) was simply a "G.P.U. agent". And altogether the whole business was arranged—Trotsky "knows how these things are done"—with the express purpose of compromising him, Trotsky, and of besmirching his snow-white reputation as a "great revolutionary." As regards Zinoviev and Kamenev, his former colleagues in the "bloc", Trotsky confirms their duplicity and provocatory role in relation to the Party by showing that they "changed opposition in principle into dumb dissatisfaction and took on a protective hue" whilst continuing to pursue the very same Trotskyist-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary aims.

The "declaration of the Bolshevik-Leninist [!] group of the Socialist Party" (the French section of the Socialist International) addressed "to the Socialist Party and to all toilers" expounds the final "position" adopted by the Trotskyites. In this "declaration" the Trotskyites, who have declared in favor of the "defense and reform [!]of the Soviet State", protest against the fact that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not tried by Party bodies but by the organs of the dictatorship and protested against the "Soviet policy" which "bases itself on alliances with capitalist countries and not on the development of the proletarian revolution", and proposed that the Socialist Party, of which they are members, should "demand that an international workers' commission" be sent to the U.S.S.R. "which would ensure guarantee for all political tendencies".

Trotsky and the Trotskyites who were characterized years ago as the "*vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie*" have slipped down to the role of agents-provocateurs of the international bourgeoisie and at times of the direct secret police. Such are their functions when in one country or another they, in opposition to the political struggle of the workers on the basis of the united front, advance technical preparations for armed actions, and expound in detail in their press the "plans" for these preparations; such is their role when they attempt, in strikebreaking fashion, to disrupt the

strike struggle of the workers, in the name of the "revolution"; such is their role when they attack the peace policy of the Soviet Government, and "demand" that it, the Soviet Government—the government of the country whose socialist construction is a mighty factor which urges forward the revolutionary struggle of the workers of all capitalist countries—should "develop the international proletarian revolution"; such is the job they fulfill when they attempt to wedge themselves between the united front of the Socialist and Communist workers in order to poison, contaminate and disrupt it from within. Finally, the provocatory role of the Trotskyists and of Trotsky himself are to be seen first and foremost in all its abomination in their methods of "struggle" against the Soviet Union and in all their criminal "exposures" and brazenly purged "evidence" which bears the clear imprint of the "literature" of the secret police and police prefectures.

* * * *

The attitude taken by the leaders of the Second International and its various sections to the murder of Sergei Kirov, one of the leading architects of the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R., and to the events which followed this—the measures taken by the government of the proletarian dictatorship—merits the most serious attention.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AS AN "INTERNATIONAL" ORGANIZATION

The post-war Second International, which at the present time is in a state of crisis and decline, never was, and never wished to be or could be, a uniform solid international organization. It was torn from within by twofold contradictions. Its national sections, each of which on principle conducted a policy of collaboration with their respective national bourgeoisie, submitted to the interests of the imperialists of their countries in foreign policy as well. Hence, frictions, groupings and contradictions existed inside the International, which exactly reproduced the inter-relations between their respective "nations" and their governments. It was not for nothing that at the session of the German Reichstag held on March 17, 1933, of the Reichstag "elected" after the Reichstag fire of February 28, that Wels, a member of the Executive Committee of the Second International, when making "reservations" regarding the home policy of the fascist government took a solemn oath, on behalf of the then united Social-Democratic fraction, of loyalty to *Hitler's foreign policy*. During the whole period of its post-war existence, the Second International has been continually splitting at its "national", *i.e.*, imperialist seams.

The leaders of the Second International, however, remained united on only one international question—despite all the "national" contradictions which divided them—namely on that of their attitude to the U.S.S.R. This attitude was determined by their hatred of revolution, of the October Revolution, of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Communism. Even in those countries where, thanks to

the interplay of imperialist contradictions, the governments temporarily pursue a foreign policy which is not quite so aggressive towards the U.S.S.R., the Social-Democrats have remained irreconcilably hostile.

In addition to this, other contradictions of a different kind have been marked with varying strength in the Second International and especially in its various sections. The Social-Democratic Parties which are bourgeois and non-proletarian in the policy they pursue have a leading apparatus (and connected with this a trade union apparatus) which is full of petty-bourgeois elements, and rests on the bourgeoisified sections of the aristocracy of labor. None the less, wide masses of workers are covered by their influence and their organization and they have had to reckon with these masses, especially at times when the class struggle has become particularly intense. These masses have had to be sheltered from the influence of consistent class revolutionary ideology, against the influence of the Communist Parties and against the fascination radiated by the land where there is the proletarian dictatorship and where socialism is being constructed. Hence, particularly in the period when the working masses have been moving Leftwards, a differentiation has developed among the Social-Democratic politicians, disputes have arisen between the Rights and the "Lefts" based frequently on a direct "division of labor" and sometimes developing into real disagreements regarding the methods to be used to fool the masses. Hence, finally, the appearance of genuinely Left leaders who, however, nourish the illusion that it is possible to win over the whole of Social-Democracy to the adoption of honest class tactics.

This friction and these rifts have become especially palpable during the years of the crisis, during the period of the offensive undertaken by fascism which has grown out of bourgeois "democracy" along the path laid out for it by the entire activity of the Social-Democratic Parties after the disgraceful collapse of the German and later the Austrian Social-Democratic Parties. The Second International and its various sections have begun more and more to leak at their class seams along the lines dividing the proletarian elements from the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements.

THE URGE OF THE MASSES FOR THE UNITED FRONT

The lessons of the German and Austrian events, and later of the events in Spain, the menace of fascism which hung over France in 1934, the experience obtained by the workers themselves in all countries, have created among the widest masses of workers in *all* capitalist countries, a powerful urge towards unity of action against the offensive of fascism and the bourgeoisie and towards the united front preached by the Communists. The wall erected by the Social-Democratic leaders between the Socialist and Communist workers has begun to shake, and wide breaches have been made in it in some countries. Despite the resistance and formal "prohibitions" of the official bodies of the Second International, the united front has been brought about in a number of countries. The Social-Democratic

leaders in these countries—just as hostile in spirit to the united front as are all the leaders of the Second International, the cornerstone of whose policy is to split the working class—have been compelled to consent to the conclusion of the united front under the threat that whole organizations with their leaders would desert the ranks of the Socialist Parties.

The united front has been concluded and is being put into operation, not always with sufficient consistency and energy and suffers from vacillations and sometimes even from direct sabotage by dishonest elements who have agreed to it with dishonest aims. Nevertheless, the very *fact* that the united front has been brought about, even though in an embryonic and imperfect form, while big concessions and sacrifices have been made by the Communist workers, has been of tremendous and decisive historic importance. The rapprochement and the joint struggle of the Socialist and Communist workers even in the most primitive forms and on a narrow basis have become a *gain* of the working class which no one will be able to take away, whether they be enemies or hypocritical "friends". The operation of the united front, as yet only in a few countries, has become a powerful stimulus to the movement for the united front of the Communists and the honest revolutionary Socialist workers in all countries.

The struggle of the workers for their vital and deeply felt economic and political interests, the struggle against the fascist offensive, against measures bringing on fascism, against the capitalist offensive on the standard of living of the toiling masses and against the growing danger of imperialist war, constitute the starting point, the primary basis of the united front. But this does not exhaust the tasks set before it by the historic development of events.

THE UNITED FRONT AND THE U.S.S.R.

A most important place among the questions which must be included in the sphere of action of the developing united front, is occupied by the question of the attitude to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union, as far as the workers—Socialist and non-party—are concerned—*is not* simply one of the numerous countries in the world. It is the first and only proletarian State in the world.

It is a State of a new type, a State which is the bearer of and the weapon of a new system—the socialist system—as contrasted to the capitalist system which rules throughout the rest of the world.

It is a State where we have the proletarian dictatorship, as opposed to *all* other States where there is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and the financial capitalists.

It is a State where socialism has been victorious and where exploitation and unemployment have been done away with—as opposed to *all* other States where capitalism is collapsing and where there is brutal exploitation and frightful and hopeless unemployment.

It is a State where socialist agriculture is flourishing tremendously as contrasted to *all* other States which doom millions of toiling peasants to ruin and starvation.

It is a State where culture and science have risen to a level without parallel in history, as opposed to *all* other States which are killing science and culture.

It is a country where democracy is most operative, drawing the entire toiling population into direct participation in the administration of the country, whereas in *all* other countries, only a handful of the financial oligarchy hold sway.

It is a State whose structure, as Lenin defined it, was from the very outset "a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic", and which now at the very time when the bourgeoisie are casting away even the surface sham democratic form of government, is opening up a new epoch in Soviet democracy, by decision of its Seventh Congress of Soviets, following the proposals made by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

It is a country which has brought about the complete equality of all nations on its territory, having put an end to all national oppression and which actively encourages the development of the national culture of all nationalities, no matter how small, and links them up with great economic construction, whereas in *all* other countries, hundreds of millions of people are groaning under national and colonial oppression. It is a country which is fundamentally hostile to imperialism, and has a Red Army which derives its power from the conscious loyalty to their socialist fatherland, of its men and their commanders, all sons of the toiling people, and from the stupendous technical achievements of socialist industry which has been created for one purpose alone, namely, that of defending socialist construction, and of constructing classless Communist society, whereas *all* the other countries, are striving towards a new partition of the world, towards the seizure of land and of peoples, and maintain armies led by officers chosen from the bourgeois and landlord classes, intended for the purpose of conducting robber imperialist wars and violently suppressing the revolutionary indignation of the workers and peasants in their own country.

For the workers in the capitalist countries, the U.S.S.R. is not a country like any other. Among the workers, the attitude taken towards the U.S.S.R. cannot be declared to be a "private matter". For the working class and for every party which wants to call itself a workers' party, its attitude to the U.S.S.R. is a class and party question.

The attitude of the workers who are loyal to their class and its interests can only be one, namely an attitude of loyalty to the U.S.S.R., of determination to defend it against all its imperialist enemies, an attitude of practical support for its struggles against all who attack the socialist system which it is building up.

The Soviet Union, the land of the victorious October Revolution, the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism in construction is by its mere existence a challenge to the whole capitalist world and a mighty weapon in the struggle of the workers of all lands for their liberation and is the embodiment of the idea of prac-

tical internationalism. The proletariat of the capitalist countries not only in the interests of the millions of workers and collective farmers of the U.S.S.R. but in their own class interests, look upon the cause of the U.S.S.R. as their own cause, near and dear to them.

This is how the broadest masses of workers, including the masses of Socialist workers in all capitalist countries, really regard the Soviet Union, the fatherland of the toilers of the whole world.

In contrast to them and the Socialist workers, the politicians who stand at the head of the Second International and its sections, continue one and all to remain enemies of the U.S.S.R., and who at every opportunity, join the chorus of international bourgeois reaction and fascism and raise a howl against the land of the Soviets. This has become clear again in the most frightful forms in connection with the punishment meted out by the Soviet Government to the murderers of Comrade Kirov and the counter-revolutionaries who trained them.

The struggle for the united front, the ever-closer fighting rapprochement between the Socialist workers and the Communist workers, must put an end to this crying contradiction.

There cannot be any place for the enemies of the U.S.S.R. in the ranks of the proletariat who are fighting in the united front.

The Communist Party of France in the Struggle for the United Front

(PART I.)

By MAURICE THOREZ

THE fundamental point to be noted in the present situation in France is the extension of the united front of the working class against fascism, and the robber policy of the "National Unity" government which is preparing to establish a fascist dictatorship.

It must be recognized as a merit of the Communist Party of France and the Party takes pride in this—that it has been able, under the leadership of the Comintern and by long and insistent efforts, to bring about, develop and consolidate a broad united front against fascism.

The Party threw all its forces on this sector of the struggle, and, beginning with 1932, it achieved great success, primarily in the wide Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. *

Immediately after the fascist offensive on February 6, 1934, the Party made repeated appeals to the Socialist workers and the Socialist Party organizations and by itself organized and carried out the big demonstration of February 9. This represented the rapid and determined repulse given by the proletariat of Paris, led by the Communist Party to the fascist gangs. This demonstration served as a prelude, a signal and preparation for the general strike of February 12 in which four million workers took action against fascism. During the succeeding months the Party succeeded in organizing hundreds of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations which on each occasion attracted an ever-increasing number of Socialist workers.

By its united front policy the Communist Party was able to bring influence to bear on the Socialist workers and to attract them to its side. It succeeded in obtaining the agreement of a number of sections and federations of the Socialist Party to participate in the conduct of joint action. Such was the demonstration of July 8 in Vincennes, when the Communist Party along with the Socialist Federation of the Seine succeeded in mobilizing 100,000 Paris proletarians against a demonstration of 18,000 members of the "Fiery Cross" organization (fascists), and this at the time when the leaders of the Socialist Party had rejected our proposal to organize a joint struggle against German fascism and in defense of Comrade Thaelmann.

The Communist Party succeeded, in July 1934, in bringing about the conclusion of a pact with the Socialist Party for joint struggle against fascism and war by operating such a united front policy of action.

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* An anti-war and anti-fascist movement. The name arises from the Amsterdam anti-war Congress and anti-fascist Congress at Pleyel.

What are the results of this pact? In other words, what has this agreement given the working class?

First, the agreement has slowed down the growth of the fascist elements. The united front has strengthened the position of the working class. The future will show, but even now note can be taken of the effectiveness of the resistance offered to all the efforts made by fascism in France, and this has aroused an echo not only in France, but it may be stated in all the world. *To a certain degree, this changes the relationship of forces between the working class and fascism in favor of the proletariat.*

Beginning with February 9, 1934, we undertook a wide campaign against the Doumergue-Tardieu government and brought about the resignation of Doumergue.

The Doumergue government was a government which arose as a result of the fascist offensive on February 6. It carried on a severe policy towards the toiling masses, and based itself more openly on the fascist gangs. In this sense, however, the Flandin government gives rise to no less apprehension, the more so as it stresses its desire to continue the same "national policy", merely conducting it by more flexible methods. This necessity of resorting to more "flexible methods" so as to carry out the national unity policy shows how strong was the resistance offered by the working class and the toiling masses.

Never have demonstrations taken place in France like those which we are organizing at the present time in France, and in the provincial working centers or in the villages.

As for the cantonal elections, the Communist Party has obtained definite successes here. We have trebled the number of our seats in the General Council, increasing them from 10 to 30. We have won new seats in approximately the same proportion in the regional councils. We greatly increased the number of votes given for our candidates in industrial centers and in the villages.

We must, of course, still further subject our work to critical analysis.

We have not been successful everywhere and to an equal extent. We have achieved success in those places where the Party has displayed great activity on the basis of a struggle for immediate demands, and where extensive actions were carried out in favor of unity of action, while on the contrary, we have marked time in those places where sectarian tendencies continue to be observed.

In any case, the success of the Communist Party in the cantonal elections shows that the path is a correct one, and that more can be achieved. This requires that we must exert our efforts still more and must do so in all spheres. We must clearly understand that while we have been successful and the forces of the working class have grown stronger owing to unity of action, the reactionary parties favorable to fascism have also achieved noticable success.

On the whole, the Socialist Party has maintained its positions with great difficulty. The Radical Party has, in actual fact lost far more votes than the statistics show, while the reactionary parties that are close to fascism have obtained important successes.

A struggle has begun between the fascists and us, revolutionary proletarians, to win the middle classes. The successes of our Party at the cantonal elections as well, show that the path we have taken is a correct one and that still more can be achieved. The political situation and the class struggle are bound to grow more intense in the near future. We are approaching these battles in a situation where the forces of the working class have grown stronger owing to the united front. And this is the foremost and most outstanding achievement of the policy of our Party.

THE MOVEMENT FOR TRADE UNION UNITY

Second, the pact, which has made easier the rapprochement between the Socialist and Communist workers, with a view to struggle has *given a new scope to the movement for trade union unity in spite of the hostile attitude of the reactionary leaders of the C.G.T.* (reformist trade unions.—*Ed.*) *to this matter.* A large number of united trade unions have been formed on the basis of the joint struggle of the workers—Communists and Socialists. The united front has encouraged the working class to form united trade unions. The pact has caused many Socialist workers in the trade unions and even at the Congress of Unions of the C.G.T. to support the thesis that the unity of the trade union movement should be brought about by amalgamating the trade union organizations, from the top to bottom. When such unity takes place in practice, a large number of previously unorganized workers join a trade union. For example, 200 men are employed in the railroad shops at Vitri, of whom 50 were members of the Unitary (revolutionary.—*Ed.*) trade union and 12 were members of the C.G.T., the remainder being unorganized. The members of the Unitary trade union appealed to the members of the C.G.T. to join the united trade union front, and immediately 112 unorganized workers also expressed a desire to join the united trade union, *i.e.*, almost all the workers in the railway shops are now in the united trade union.

In spite of the recent refusal of the C.G.T. to amalgamate, the number of united trade unions is continually growing and has now reached 275.

In the same way the movement for trade union unity is growing among the members of the other trade unions. Amalgamations of railway workers have been organized on the various railways—one in the south, another on the Paris-Orleans line, while on December 16 a united trade union Amalgamation will be formed on the Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean line, the busiest railway system in France. In other words we are approaching closer to a united federation of railway men in France.

In the same way amalgamations have been brought about in the Counties (Departments). We will give one example from Iser. Two administrative commissions of two county trade union amalgamations joined together. They set up a single bureau and carried on joint agitational and preparatory campaigns throughout the whole Depart-

ment, in all the sections of Grenoble. This shows how strong are the strivings of the working masses towards trade union unity.

In spite of all the efforts of the Communists, and especially of those who are at the head of the Unitary trade unions thanks to the confidence of the workers in them, they have not succeeded in bringing about the restoration of the unity of the trade unions.

The reactionary trade union leaders of the C.G.T. have succeeded once more in bringing about the rejection of these proposals by their Central Executive Committees. The leaders of the C.G.T. trade unions do not want unity for the struggle against the employers and against fascism.

But the question of trade union unity could not be decided by negative resolutions and even by the unanimous votes of the Central Committee of the C.G.T. Discontent is growing and the movement for trade union unity is taking on a new scope.

The most important fact since the last Plenum of the C.C. of the General Confederation of Labor is the acceptance of the proposals for unity of action by the C.G.T. railwaymen's trade union. This proposal was again made by the unitary railwaymen's trade union organization only a few days after a fresh refusal by the C.G.T., which is up in arms against unity of action, and opposes it by advancing the thesis that the Unitary Trade Unions should be liquidated as a preliminary.

The example of the railwaymen confirms the possibility of bringing about the unity of the trade union movement. *All that is necessary is that a more attentive attitude should be adopted to the defense of the direct demands of the workers and employees, to the organization of the struggle against the emergency decrees and to the preparations and development of economic struggles against the capitalist offensive which is the only genuine road to class trade union unity. We should not harbor* any illusions as to the possibility of trade union unity being achieved without a stubborn and insistent struggle against the reactionary leaders of the C.G.T. who are hostile to the united front of struggle against fascism, war and the capitalist offensive. Such illusions only facilitate the splitting maneuvers of some of the leaders of the C.G.T.

Third, the struggle of the masses on the basis of the united front, and of the agreement achieved regarding joint action against fascism, the war danger and the emergency decrees renders it difficult for fascism to form a mass basis.

We have achieved success in the *war veterans'* movement which in the past was entirely under the leadership of reactionary and fascist elements. Whereas on February 6 some of the veterans demonstrated on the side of the "Fiery Cross" and the "Royalist Youth", side by side with the fascist organizations and under reactionary leadership, we have been able, since July 8, the date of the national War Veterans' conference which was a victory for the reactionary and fascist tendencies, to call forth such resistance and create such opposition among the ex-servicemen who are workers, peasants and toilers, that the reactionary leaders were forced to retreat. And on

November 11 for the first time we succeeded in organizing a mass demonstration of ex-servicemen to the Place de la Nation, while the reactionary sections of the ex-servicemen together with the fascist youth associations organized the traditional march to the Arc de Triomphe and took advantage of this to demand the return of the Doumergue Government which had only just resigned. Four days later, the chairman of the Council of Ministers was forced to admit from the parliamentary tribune that the Communists had succeeded in organizing a mass demonstration of war veterans. In this connection, I wish to say that 28 of the so-called "Left" ex-servicemen's associations took part in this march, carrying posters with the following words: "We demand the maintenance of our rights and we wish to fight along with the Communists for the pact against war". For the first time ex-servicemen took part in a demonstration organized on a decision of our C.C. They all wore their medals, crosses and military orders, and the demonstration was cheered by the masses of people of Paris along the whole of the route from St. Antoine—the old revolutionary district of Paris—across the Bastille Square to the Place de la Nation.

The ex-servicemen's movement led by our Party is a big movement representing a considerable force in the anti-fascist struggle.

WORK AMONG THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

The Communist Party has also obtained some successes among the masses of peasants in France. Hitherto, the reactionary elements of the Agrarian Party have not been able to form a united reactionary peasant front. On November 28 they organized a demonstration in Paris, in which, according to their calculations, tens of thousands of peasants should have participated. However, not more than four to five thousand were present. The reactionary sections of the peasantry were thus unable to form an agrarian bloc. We, however, have been unable to extend our influence over the peasant masses, to take the first steps in bringing about the united front in the peasant movement between the Federation of Toiling Peasants (an organization under Communist influence) and the National Federation of Peasants (an organization under the influence of the Socialists), which concluded their first agreement regarding joint struggle recently.

The Taxpapers' Federation which organizes certain sections of the urban middle class and petty bourgeoisie, is collapsing. In reality, it has already fallen to pieces. The *small traders* are protesting against its fascist leaders who organized a demonstration in which they took part a year or eighteen months ago, and forced them to shout: "Down with the crooks!" "We demand fiscal reform!" They are protesting against their leaders who compelled parliament to carry through fiscal reform which reduced the taxes to be paid by the big merchants and capitalists and increased the taxes on the small shopkeepers, and the taxes on necessities of life which are used by the workers and peasants.

In the recent period a certain polarization has taken place among the *intellectuals* as well, considerable numbers of whom are gravitat-

ing towards Communism. A committee of anti-fascist intellectuals has been formed, uniting 5,000 writers, professors and scientists, and including the best known writers in France. The anti-fascist front has gathered together quite a number of the most famous names in the scientific world, people who have openly stated their desire to fight on the side of the revolutionary workers, the Communist workers, against all fascist attacks.

Still more sympathetic is the intensification of the rivalry and conflicts among the fascist associations themselves. In France there are at least half a dozen fascist leagues of various kinds such as the "Royalist Youth", "Patriotic Youth", "Fiery Cross", "French Solidarity", "Francists", etc. At the present time discord and quarrels reign supreme in these organizations. And there is no central organization to stand out against all these fascist leagues, and be above all these squabbles and disputes, although there is a tendency towards the unification of all the fascist leagues.

All these successes of ours in the struggle for the petty-bourgeois strata of the population, and for the leadership of the proletariat and the movement of the broad toiling masses have been achieved on the basis of the struggle on two fronts, both against Right opportunism and against sectarianism.

The last conference of the C.P. of France placed great emphasis on the demands of the non-proletarian social strata, on the needs of the middle classes. We shall return to these demands and shall speak in greater detail about them, when we deal with the program of the people's anti-fascist front.

All the facts quoted above enable us to state that we have made a good beginning in carrying out the decisions of the National Party Conference regarding the demands of the middle classes. Very much space in the manifesto issued by the Party on this matter was devoted to these demands. All our materials, posters and leaflets set out with the greatest force and clarity, and in an original and and attractive form, the question of the immediate demands of the toiling masses. For this reason the response was a big one. A powerful polemic was raised against us in the press. Expressing pretended surprise regarding our sudden liking for the "small traders", "small peasants", and "small handicraft men", they accuse us of demagogy. You know that we have replied to this by advancing the financial program of our Party, in a speech in defense of the "average Frenchman". After this M. Doumergue made a speech in which he was forced to carry on a polemic against our program for the progressive taxation of the big capitalists and the supplementary taxation of incomes above 50,000 francs. At that time we published our "reply to Doumergue" which met with unparalleled success, because it reacted in a most convincing form to all the questions raised by the toilers and the middle classes.

Fourth, the operation of the united front, the conduct of the joint struggle of the workers—Socialists and Communists, has not only hindered fascism in providing itself with a mass basis, has not only assisted the movement to establish a united trade union movement,

but has also called forth *strivings towards unity in the other mass organizations of the toilers.* Here we must note our successes among the sportsmen. We have succeeded in organizing a *united workers' sports federation* in France. Our influence now also extends to a workers' sports organization with 300,000 members, the Republican Sports Organization, in which there are bourgeois sports clubs as well. We have already raised the question, which is not without prospects of success, of establishing international unity among worker sportsmen.

In the same way we see success in our work among *women,* work hitherto carried on very badly. The first big successes of the Party and the Communist women in respect to work among women were demonstrated by the world Women's Anti-Fascist Congress held on August 6, 1934. There is now in France a National Women's Committee against War and Fascism which covers 600 committees, of which there are 75 in Paris alone.

Fifth, and last, the united front and the agreement reached between the Socialist and Communist Parties have *considerably increased the influence of the Communist Party and have raised its authority.*

Our Party has become a factor which has to be taken into account in the political life of France. The pact has considerably increased the prestige and authority of our Communist Party, in spite of the efforts made by the enemies of the united front—the Trotskyites and the liquidator Doriot, who have tried to discredit us by speaking of the "changes" and "turn" we have made, dictated allegedly by the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. But they have not succeeded in covering up the fact that our Communist Party is the body which has initiated and inspired unity of action, and fights for and organizes the united front struggle of the working class, against fascism, war and the capitalist offensive. And all this in spite of the efforts of the Socialists, Trotskyites and the renegade Doriot to discredit our Party by stating that the united front is merely a maneuver on our part, and that we are merely submitting to orders from Moscow! They said that the united front is one of the elements of the foreign policy of the Soviet Government.

All these efforts, however, have not succeeded in obscuring the clear realization in the minds of the masses that our Party is the initiator and organizer of the unity of action of the working class.

The extent to which the influence and authority of the Party have grown is shown by the polemic with Doumergue and by the Cantonal elections. We have already spoken of the polemic with Doumergue in a different connection.

Although the results of the cantonal elections were different in various places—in some districts we gained nothing, in some we even lost ground, and this was always connected with the policy conducted by the various Party organizations—*nevertheless on the whole they show considerable successes for our party throughout the country, an increase in the number of our deputies and a considerable increase in the number of votes obtained.*

The growth of the influence of our Party is also shown by the increase in the circulation of *L'Humanite* which has now risen to 200,000 daily.

Thus, by applying the tactics of the united front, the C.P. of France has increased the fighting capacity of the working class, who has successfully repelled the first attacks of fascism. Our Party has strengthened the confidence of the working class in its own power, has strengthened its influence over the masses, increased its membership and helped to increase the membership of the Y.C.L. It has brought about a rise in the political level of its cadres, increased the urge of the working class towards trade union unity, helped the Communist workers to find the correct approach to the Socialist workers, assisted the development of the struggles for the united front on the international arena, and deepened the crisis and the contradictions in the Second International.

* * * * *

Such are our successes in regard to the united front. However we must not close our eyes to the fact *that the C.P. of France has not yet succeeded in developing strike struggles against the capitalist offensive on the standard of living of the proletariat; we have not been able to overcome the resistance of the Socialist Party and reformist C.G.T. to the development of the strike movement and the development of the struggle for trade union unity.* It will only be possible to overcome this resistance if *the Party carries on a stubborn struggle for the further development of the united front, by drawing the toilers into it, by increasing the leading role of the Party therein, and by setting up rank and file united front bodies in town and country. In this connection the main task facing the C.P. of France in carrying out the tactics of the united front is to get the toilers to give up the attitude of defense and to undertake a wide offensive struggle against the capitalists, to unleash the struggle of the masses for the transfer of the burden of the crisis to the big capitalists with the prospect of developing and widening this struggle and converting it into decisive struggles for the overthrow of the capitalist system.*

If this task is to be successfully fulfilled the following gross mistakes and weaknesses must be eliminated in the work of the C.P. of France in carrying out its united front tactics.

MISTAKES AND WEAKNESSES IN THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED FRONT

First. While taking as our starting point the sound consideration that the Socialists must not be given any grounds for breaking the pact—nevertheless in a number of cases we have gone further in refraining from criticism than was provided for in the pact, in some cases being more accommodating to the Socialist Party than was necessary, and have not exposed the disloyalty of certain leaders of the Socialists to the pact with a view to strengthening our Communist influence among the masses and consequently, to strengthening the united front activity. As a result of this we did not criticize the resolution of the Socialist Party, which announced its readiness to participate in the ministry after the fall of the Doumergue govern-

ment. We have also not utilized the political refusal of the Socialist Parties—the so-called "minority" of the Second International which were for the united front with the Communists—to hold a joint conference with the Communists on the question of the defense of the Spanish revolution.

An example of an attitude of accommodation towards the reformists is provided by the decision of the C.G.T.U. leaders in connection with the unity of the railway workers, where the Red trade unions, although in the majority, accepted the principle of equal representation, whereas proportional representation has so far been used in other united unions, where the supporters of the C.G.T.U. were in the minority.

Such mistakes were also made in the provinces, although they were of less significance. For example, our comrades in the North were not prepared to make use of the speakers from the center at joint meetings with the Socialists, with the result that comrades but little experienced in politics, had to face up to smart politicians; finally, when a proposal was made to reduce the sale of Party literature, our comrades—although they finally rejected this proposal—at first almost agreed to it. Mistakes were also made in Alsace where, under the pressure of Social-Democracy, there was a tendency among our comrades to slacken the struggle for the self-determination of the population of Alsace.

Second. While setting itself the correct task of drawing up a program of urgent demands for the "people's front" which could rally the broadest strata of the toiling masses, the C.P. of France omitted to advance such popular demands among the masses as social insurance at the expense of the employers and the State, a special tax on the profits of the big capitalists, and the progressive taxation of the capitalists, and so considerably lowered the revolutionary content of the program.

To the present program of the "people's front" we must add slogans of struggle against high prices, which would make it possible to attract a considerable number of workers' wives into the movement. The struggle against high prices must not hurt the small traders who are also victims of the crisis, but must primarily be directed against the speculators, houseowners, and owners of big wholesale stores, and must aim at lowering retail prices and abolishing taxes on commodities of vital necesessity. At the same time the Party must struggle against taxes which are a heavy burden on the small traders and help to organize them in the struggle against the big middlemen.

Third. In its struggle to bring about the united front our Party frequently took the line of pure propaganda. We paid too little attention to the economic struggle against the emergency laws. This is the chief cause of the relative ease with which the C.G.T. leaders were able to reject our proposals to bring about trade union unity. Though in our reply to the Socialist Party (published in *L'Humanite* of December 9, 1934), we correctly raised the question of partial demands, and seriously criticized the so-called nationalization pro-

posals made by the Socialists as a cover to hide their refusal to struggle for the vital demands put forward by the masses, we did not point out the prospects for the further struggle of the Party for the united front, and the new concrete steps to be taken in the struggle for unity of action and the unity of the trade union movement. In its reply the Party should have clearly pointed out the prospects for the toilers undertaking an offensive against the capitalists by extending the united front to include the trade union organizations, as the threshold leading to trade union unity, and also by forming a powerful network of rank and file unity committees in the factories and in the villages.

Fourth. The struggle of the Party for the united front has not yet emerged from the stage of agitation, and has not been consolidated organizationally by the establishment of mass organs of struggle. We must admit that joint action was reduced to meetings and a few demonstrations. We underestimated the importance of rank and file united front committees. Very little has been done in this sphere since the pact was signed, but the chief task facing the Communist Party in the struggle for real unity of action on the part of the proletariat should be the establishment of a wide network of rank and file committees in town and country. These committees will be the best guarantees against the attempts of the Socialist leaders to break the united front. They will also be one of the chief conditions for the extension of the movement for unity to new sections of toilers. They will help the masses to pass speedily to the offensive against capital, with a view to shifting burdens on to the shoulders of the bourgeoisie. They will be the most important basis of support in the development of the struggle of the masses to overthrow the capitalist system.

The absence of self-defense committees to operate against the fascists is a mistake which shows that the C.P. of France has not yet emerged from the stage of agitation for the united front.

Fifth. In our struggle for trade union unity we have paid too much attention to discussions with the C.G.T. leaders regarding procedure in connection with unity, instead of directing all our efforts to developing the strike movement in defense of the workers' demands on the one hand, and to extending trade union unity by the formation of united trade unions, on the other.

Sixth. In spite of some improvement in the work of the Communists in the village to which we have already referred, we still fail to understand the need for turning to the peasantry, a fact which is particularly expressed in the weaknesses of the agrarian department of the Communist Party, and the general confederation of the toiling peasantry. We must therefore put an end to the neglect of work among the peasants, and must carefully and concretely draw up the demands of the farm laborers, peasants, sharecroppers and small peasants, in correspondence with the character of agricultural production in the different districts. The increase of work among the peasants should find its expression in the coordination of the struggle of the workers and peasants, in the formation of peasant committees and the action of these committees jointly with the anti-high prices committees (the struggle against speculators, landlords, moneylenders,

trusts, against big middlemen, against taxes, customs duties, etc.).

All these political mistakes and weaknesses show that the *employment of the united front tactics, which open up wide possibilities for winning the masses, at the same time create the conditions for the growth of the danger of Right opportunism in our Party.* The C.P. of France is overcoming this danger, and is energetically overcoming the *sectarian habits* still strong in its ranks, without for a minute forgetting the task of *strengthening the party itself organizationally* in the process of developing united front tactics, and without omitting the task *of winning the leading role in the mass movement* the tasks of *strengthening the independent role of the Party* as the only consistent fighter which is leading the masses to the struggle for dictatorship of the proletariat.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE UNITED FRONT

As a result of development of the struggle of the workers, the Socialist Party is getting into a more and more difficult position. It feels that it is lagging behind in the recruitment of new members and sees the deterioration in the distribution of its press. The bourgeoisie are the Socialist Party's chief councillor and are frightened at the establishment of the united front in France. Here, for example, is what the *Temps* writes: "Well, we have given you peace; the Flandin government is not a fascist menace; can you continue to participate in the united front with the Communists?" And further, the *Temps* adds: "You see that you are not securing new members. You are losing to the Communists. This policy must be stopped." It is in order to make a few remarks here of a general nature showing why there are tendencies in the Socialist Party towards destroying the pact at the present time.

1. The internal situation in France: we have the Flandin government in power, the national unity government, which wants to conduct a policy of plunder and grinding down the masses by more flexible methods. The Socialists, and Blum in particular, say: "The republic has begun to breathe freely". The Socialists are letting the government understand that in the conditions that have arisen, a party like the Socialist Party must be a legal parliamentary opposition, and only then will it again be able to reduce everything to a parliamentary game.

There is no doubt that the government will take some steps in the near future against the teachers, and in the sphere of taxation. The new bread and wine laws, and the further existence of the emergency decrees will rapidly break down the still existing illusions regarding the Flandin government. It should be said that among some sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and among some categories of workers there is a tendency to exaggerate the difference between the Flandin and Doumergue governments—illusions fostered by the leaders of the Socialist Party to the effect that the fascist danger is now past.

2. The carrying through of the united front in France has received an international response, and the leaders of the Second Inter-

national are doing a great deal to force the Socialist Party of France to break the agreement on the united front.

When Cachin and I met Vandervelde and Adler in Brussels, we could very well see how alarmed the old politician Vandervelde was at the united front. We could very well see what alarm there is at the present time in the Socialist International.

The discussion in Paris between the leaders of the Social-Democratic Parties was very stormy.

The attitude of Blum to the united front was rather one of toleration. He wanted to give himself an alibi before the French workers. He wanted to justify himself before the workers who are dissatisfied with the policy of the Second International. If we allow him to do this he is prepared to "mix" with us, but at the same time, and this is most important, he does not want to anger his friends from the Second International.

Bauer's position is a characteristic one. He spoke roughly as follows: "Have we gained much from your united front? You are discrediting us. What will the people in Czechoslovakia think? With whom are we working? You have attached yourself to the Communists, and we are participating in the governments of Denmark and Sweden and are aiming at the same thing in Great Britain. In France, you have also prospects of a radical government and you compromise yourselves with the Communists. You will have to give up such a policy."

Considerable pressure is being exerted on the Socialist Party by the reactionary leaders of the C.G.T. The pact has strengthened the will to struggle for the unity of the trade union movement. The C.G.T. is to a considerable extent under the leadership of the neo-Socialists. We have told the Socialist workers the following: "The people whom you have driven out of the Socialist Party are people who do not want the trade union movement to be united. They are doing everything possible in this direction. They encourage the leaders of the C.G.T."

This is what Jiromski was forced to write on this subject in a Left Wing paper of the Socialist Party: "The C.G.T. does not act like the C.G.T.U:; it opposes trade union unity". Jiromski reproaches the C.G.T.U. on the question of the united front, *at the same time praising its plan which is a copy of the notorious plan of De Man, the plan of the neo-Socialists.*

3. A struggle is breaking out afresh among the leaders of the Socialist Party. Frossard, the Attentists and others are fighting against Blum, etc. Even the "Lefts" have become scared.

Veuille, the social-imperialist and deputy from Alsace-Lorraine gave the following characterization of the state of mind in the national council with all the cynicism of a reactionary: "You are afraid of a split. Better break away before it is too late." Hence the attempt to dig up causes for, or rather to create an excuse for a split, throwing the responsibility for this onto the Communist Party.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

The Seventeenth Anniversary of the Red Army

FEBRUARY 23, 1918—FEBRUARY 23, 1935

THE world is developing along two paths—along the path taken by the U.S.S.R., the land where *socialism is victorious*, and along that taken by the capitalist countries, a path of capitalism in decay and where there is a growth of fascist oppression, unemployment, hunger and the impoverishment of the toiling masses. The capitalists are trying to find a way out of the crisis through fascism and war, and by intensifying their offensive on the toiling masses.

In the capitalist countries, extreme imperialist circles are coming to power, their object being to unleash new wars of annexation. Certain capitalist countries have passed to an active policy of annexation. The Japanese imperialists are lording it over China, just as though they were at home. Germany and Japan have withdrawn from the League of Nations so as to obtain a free hand in the armaments race and the intensification of their war preparations. Diplomatic preparations for the war to divide the world anew are being intensified, as is also the search for allies, etc.

War between the capitalist States and a new anti-Soviet war are approaching. There is no more reliable stronghold of peace in the world than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the light of this, the role and importance of the Red Army—the stronghold of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the sentinel of the Soviet frontiers, of the fatherland of the toilers of all countries—grows ever greater.

THE RED ARMY AS THE WEAPON OF THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

The Red Army was born in the struggle of the proletariat for the conquest of power. "Only an armed people can be a real bulwark of the freedom of the people", wrote Lenin as far back as the beginning of 1905.* The Red Army arose as an armed force, called upon to destroy the domination of the exploiters. The Red Army is an army of liberated workers and peasants, an army wherein fraternity exists between the peoples, an army for liberating oppressed peoples, and is a weapon of the proletarian dictatorship. It is the child of the proletarian revolution, its vigilant sentinel.

In his speech on the Tenth Anniversary of the Red Army, Comrade Stalin characterized the special features which fundamentally distinguish the Red Army from all past and present armies in the world by stating that:

> "All armies which have existed hitherto, no matter what their composition, were and are armies to confirm the domination of capital. As against these armies our Red Army has the peculiar quality that it is a weapon to confirm the power

* Lenin, *Collected Works*, "The Beginning of the Revolution in Russia", Vol. VI, 1st Edition, p. 60, Russ. Ed.

of the workers and peasants, a weapon to confirm the dictatorship of the proletariat, a weapon to liberate the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists. Our army is an army whose purpose is to liberate the toilers."

THE ROOTS OF THE RED ARMY ARE IN THE WORKERS' FIGHTING DETACHMENTS

The roots of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, to use Comrade Voroshilov's expression, "are in the workers' fighting detachments" which were established in the period of the 1905 Revolution.

In 1905 the Party succeeded in organizing armed detachments of workers in nearly all the proletarian centers of tsarist Russia—in St. Petersburg (today the city of the great Lenin—Leningrad), Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, in the Donetz coal basin and in other big centers. These detachments on more than one occasion in the course of the Revolution carried on a heroic struggle against the police and troops of tsarist Russia.

The December uprising of 1905 in Moscow showed with particular force what these armed detachments of the working class were capable of doing; not more than 8,000 organized and armed workers resisted the entire military police force, which tsarism was in a position to utilize for the suppression of the revolt over a period of nine days. In 1905 these detachments fought with exceptional courage. Traditions of exceptional proletarian heroism were accumulated on the barricades of Krasnaya Presnaya (a working-class district in Moscow) in the fighting clashes of the workers with the police and the troops, and throughout the country, and these guaranteed the victories of the Red guard detachments in October 1917, and the victories of the Red Army in the subsequent years.

Along with the work carried on to create armed workers' detachments, the Bolsheviks at all the stages of their revolutionary struggle, both during the years of reaction and during those of the upsurge, during the war and after the February Revolution in 1917 really fulfilled Lenin's directives regarding the necessity for " a real *struggle* for the troops" and paid great attention to disintegrating the old army in a revolutionary manner, to winning the masses of the soldiers to the side of the revolution. In this connection Lenin wrote:

". . . The first commandment of every victorious revolution, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasised, was: smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a new one. In rising to power the new social class never could, and cannot now, attain power or consolidate it except by absolutely disintegrating the old army. . . ."*

The years of tense work carried on by the Bolsheviks in illegal conditions to prepare the armed forces of the revolution and the tireless work of disintegrating the tsarist army—all this forged the military cadres of the Bolshevik Party. This is why the Party was able, after the overthrow of the autocracy, to distribute splendid

* Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky*, p. 64.

organizational forces among the factories and enterprises so as to consolidate the armed detachments of the workers, and the Red guard detachments, and to send them into the army to lead the soldiers' organizations. The task of establishing Red Guard detachments went on in full swing in every town and every factory.

In Petrograd, just before the October days (October 22) there were about 20,000 armed Red guards. The number of unarmed workers grouped around the Red guards was considerably greater.

Besides the armed workers' detachments, the working class had at the time of the October Revolution the support of several regiments soaked in Bolshevik propaganda and of various units of the old army and of practically all the sailors in the Baltic.

These armed forces gained victory over the forces of the bourgeoisie in the days of the October socialist revolution in Petrograd, Moscow, and later in other cities.

Thus, the Red Army was born in the struggle for Soviet Power. The Red Army is the child of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In order to set up a reliable armed support of the Soviet State, to carry on the struggle against the counter-revolution which was already rearing its head in the Don region, the Urals and the Ukraine, a decree signed by Lenin was proclaimed on January 28, 1918, regarding the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

THE ORGANIZERS AND LEADERS OF THE RED ARMY

> "In the epoch of the disintegration of imperialism and of the growth of civil war, it is impossible either to preserve the old army or to form a new one based on so-called non-class or national principles. The Red Army as the weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat must of necessity have an open class character. . . . "

So reads the program of the C.P.S.U. adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party in 1919.

Even before the program was confirmed, the above-mentioned decree regarding the formation of a Red Army read:

> "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is constituted from the most class-conscious and organized toiling elements."

Thus, the basic principle of the establishment of the Red Army as a class army of the toilers was set down in the first decree.

The fighting forces of the Red Army were got together and consolidated in the fire of the civil war, while intervention was taking place and while White Guard armies were being established under cover of foreign troops. Examples of unheard of enthusiasm and heroism were often displayed by the poorly clad and hungry Red fighters.

Lenin, the greatest genius of mankind, personally led the work of constituting, arming and supplying the army.

Comrade Stalin, Lenin's closest comrade-in-arms, ensured by his personal leadership that the most decisive and militant tasks were fulfilled.

After the decree was issued regarding the organization of the Red Army, an All-Russian Tribunal was set up to establish the Red Army.

A particularly important role in developing the establishment of the Red Army was played by the organizational-agitational department of this Tribunal. This department was headed by L. M. Kaganovich, now secretary of the C.C. and of the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U., and Comrade Stalin's best co-worker.

In 1918 there was formed the famous detachment led by the old Bolshevik, K. E. Voroshilov, the beloved leader of the Red Army and today People's Commissar for Defense of the U.S.S.R. "The fateful hour has struck," wrote Voroshilov (then working in Lugansk) in an appeal to the Donetz workers. "We have our fate in our own hands. It depends upon us to save our socialist fatherland, and thereby to hasten the international socialist revolution which has begun. . . . To arms! All as one man! With arms in our hands, and fighting in well-formed iron ranks we will strike at the enemies of labor, at the drones, at the German, Russian and Ukrainian White Guards."

In 1918, under the leadership of Stalin and Voroshilov, the heroic Red Army organized the defense of Tsaritsin (now Stalingrad) which was surrounded by White Guards from without and swarmed inside with officers who were preparing an insurrection. Tsaritsin is a most important railroad junction and a very big port on the Volga.

Comrade Voroshilov describes the role played by Stalin in the epic struggle round Tsaritsin in the following words:

> "Comrade Stalin headed the newly created Revolutionary Military Council which began its work of organizing a regular army. And only Stalin with his magnificent organizational capacities was able, though he had no previous military training (Comrade Stalin had never served in any army!), so well to understand special military questions in the then extremely difficult circumstances.
>
> "I remember, as though it were today, the beginning of August 1918. The Krasnov Cossacks were attacking Tsaritsin, trying with one concentrated drive to throw back the Red Army units to the Volga. For many days the Red troops, headed by the Communist division composed entirely of workers from the Donetz Basin, withstood the extremely powerful attacks of the excellently organized Cossack units. These were days of great trial. You should have seen Comrade Stalin at that time. Calm as usual, deep in thought, he literally had no sleep for days on end, distributing his intensive work between the fighting positions and the Army Headquarters. The position at the front became almost catastrophic. . . . We had no way out. But Stalin cared nothing for this. He was inspired with one single thought—victory! To smash up the enemy, whatever happened. And this indomitable will of Stalin was passed on to his closest colleagues, and despite the almost hopeless position, nobody doubted in our ultimate victory. We were victorious. The enemy was beaten and thrown far back in the direction of the Don."*

* *Life of Stalin*, pp. 59-60.

Following the successes on the Tsaritsin front, the Party sent Stalin, Lenin's closest colleague, to the most responsible fronts: to the Eastern front (Kolchak), to Petrograd (Yudenich), to the Southern front (Denikin), and everywhere and under difficult conditions, the brilliant strategist of the revolution, Comrade Stalin, brought about a turn and decisive successes.

The armed forces of the proletarian revolution grew and became consolidated in exceptionally difficult conditions, in a country devastated by the imperialist war and literally under fire. These difficulties were rendered more acute by the fact that the building up of armed forces took place while an uninterrupted struggle was carried on by the Party against the very big mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and Trotsky who was at that time its leader.

"The difficulties in organizing a regular Red Army in the first years of its existence cannot," Comrade Voroshilov has stated, "be explained away as being entirely due to objective reasons." Not a small role was played in this connection by subjective reasons. It was these very objective reasons which once compelled Comrade Stalin when he was sent to save the situation on one of the fronts to write to Lenin to the effect that he (Stalin) was being transformed into "a specialist in the art of cleaning up the stables of military headquarters". It was in these words that Comrade Stalin aptly characterized the work of the then Revolutionary Military Council and the leadership of Trotsky.

The question of Trotsky's work was raised with the greatest sharpness and keenness as early as the Seventh Party Congress at the beginning of 1919.

The military delegates were almost unanimously of the opinion that the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in respect to organizational creative work was "too bad for words". They "complained that they received no reinforcements from the center", and there was "strong dissatisfaction with Trotsky for his unsympathetic and hostile attitude to the old Bolsheviks who were at the front bearing the whole burden of the hottest campaigns on their own shoulders." At that time Trotsky already tried to have a number of responsible Communist fighters at the front shot, and it was only the interference of the C.C. of the Party and the resistance offered by the responsible comrades at the front that prevented a numbr of people being put to death.

Everyone is aware of the very serious mistakes made by Trotsky on the Southern front, where it was only Comrade Stalin's interference which saved the situation resulting in the utter defeat of Denikin by the Red Army.

In the period following the end of the civil war, when the structure of the Red Army needed to be advanced to a higher level, Trotsky's complete bankruptcy became evident, as well as his inability to solve the new positive tasks.

The C.C. removed Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, not only as one who had shown himself

to be an enemy of the Party but also as a person incapable of fulfilling the Party work assigned to him.

The Red Army was built by the C.P.S.U. It was only, thanks to the intense efforts of the whole of the Party, under the direct *leadership* of the greatest strategists of the epoch, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, who "in a brief period became our real Bolshevik military specialists" (Voroshilov), that the proletarian dictatorship achieved complete victory on all the fronts of the civil war.

The Red Army had and still has its talented military leaders in the persons of Voroshilov, Budenny, Tukhachevski, Blucher, Yegorov, Uborevich, Yakir, Gai, Kutyanov, Fedko and many other famous soldiers of the revolution. It had such great world famous military commanders as Frunze, Chapayev, etc.

The Red Army is a real army of workers and peasants. One of the chief causes which ensured the victory of the Red Army was the consolidation of the alliance of the working class with the middle peasants under the leadership of the working class and the Leninist Party. One of the special features of the Red Army is the fact that it is an "army of fraternity between the peoples, an army for the liberation of the oppressed peoples" (Stalin). The Red Army enjoyed the absolute support not only of the toiling masses of the U.S.S.R., but also of the broad masses of the toilers in the capitalist countries, including those countries which attacked the country of the Soviets.

In his historic speech at the Seventeenth Party Congress regarding the results of the first Five-Year Plan, Comrade Stalin explained the causes of the victories achieved on the front of socialist construction and stated that

> "The working class of the U.S.S.R. is not only strong in the fact that it has a very Leninist Party, tested in battle. It is strong not only because it has the support of the millions of toiling peasants. It is also strong because it is backed up and helped by the world proletariat. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, while our Republic is the child of the world proletariat."*

THE RED ARMY AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

After defeating the interventionists in open battle and cleansing the Soviet frontiers in the North, South and West and the Far East from the imperialist bandits (the last interventionists, the Japanese, were only driven out of the Far East in 1922), the Soviet Union won a breathing space for itself and set about the restoration and the socialist reconstruction of its national economy.

> "Having started on our peaceful construction, we will use every effort to continue it without a break. At the same time, comrades, be on your guard, maintain the defenses of our country and our Red Army like the apple of your eye."**

Such were the behests of Comrade Lenin.

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* Stenographic Report of the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., p. 36, Russ. Ed.
** Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 120, Russ. Ed.

In 1929 the Red Army underwent a new test. The imperialists provoked the Chinese militarists in the Far East to test the strength of the frontiers of the Soviet Union with their bayonets. But they received a crushing repulse.

The workers and collective farmers in the land of the Soviets, and their Government, can well see the frantic preparations for new intervention being conducted by the capitalist world. The open anti-Soviet program of "colonizing lands in the East", as propagated by German fascism has been estimated at its true worth by the toilers of the U.S.S.R. "It must not be forgotten that there is now in Europe a ruling Party which openly declares its historic task to be the seizure of territories in the Soviet Union"—so stated Comrade Molotov at the Seventh Congress of Soviets. The extensive and thorough preparations which the Japanese imperialists are making for an attack on the U.S.S.R. cannot be hidden from the eyes of every conscious worker, of every advanced collective farmer in the land of the Soviets. The toiling masses of the U.S.S.R. see and approve the insistent policy of peace which the Soviet Government has pursued throughout the whole period of its existence. But they also understand that the jungle law of capitalism allows respect only for the strong and that *the power and might of the Red Army, and the growth of the defensive power of the U.S.S.R., are the real guarantee of the inviolability of the frontiers of the socialist fatherland.* This realization lies at the basis of the unanimous approval of the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet government to strengthen the Red Army, displayed by the whole population of the Soviet Union, as was demonstrated with such force at the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets. "To fail to see the approach of a new war would be to close our eyes to an obvious danger," said Comrade Molotov at the Congress. And he was the spokesman of the whole country.

The successes of the Soviet Union in industrializing the country and in collectivizing agriculture have played a decisive role in raising the power of the U.S.S.R. to defend itself.

In his book against Duehring, Engles wrote that "nothing depends on economic conditions to such a degree as the army and navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, technique and strategy depend directly on the degree to which production and the means of communication are developed."

The Red Army, the faithful guardian of Soviet territory, does not lag a single step, in its military perfection, behind the level of the development of the productive forces of the U.S.S.R. And how gigantic were the victories with which the land of the Soviets came to the Seventh All-Union Congress of the Soviets!

Thanks to the exceptional attention paid to the defenses of the Soviet Union by the Party and its leader, Comrade Stalin, the strength and power of the workers' and peasants' army has been multiplied in recent years. The Soviet Union is now able to produce on a vast scale all the modern means of defense and to supply them in full to the Red Army.

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade

Molotov, stated the following in his report at the recent Congress of Soviets:

> "We consider it a great achievement that during the recent period the technical equipment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has considerably increased. This can be seen if only from the following fact: compared with the period at the time of the last Congress of Soviets, the mechanical equipment (*i.e.*, the mechanical horsepower) at the disposal of each Red Army man has increased four times." [Applause.]

This statement made by the head of the Soviet Government was illustrated by concrete facts and figures by the Assistant People's Commissar of Defense, Comrade Tukhachevski, and by a number of delegates in their speeches.

What are the basic facts regarding the growth of the power and strength of the Red Army.

During the last four years, the strength of the Soviet *air force* has grown 330 per cent. The qualities of the army planes (lifting power, speed, radius of action) have also improved. The well-known aeroplane designer, Professor Tupolev, the originator of the plans and the constructor of the giant "Maxim Gorki" aeroplane, gave interesting figures in his speech at the Congress of Soviets regarding the growth of Soviet aviation.

Ten years ago Soviet aeroplanes were only able to cover a distance of 400 kilometers, but this year an "R.D." aeroplane covered a distance of 12,400 kilometers without landing and without taking in fuel. Progress in construction has advanced from a one-seater with a 35 h.p. engine to the giant 7,000 h.p. "Maxim Gorki".

> "*And I make the definite statement,*" he declared, "*that on the basis which we now have in the Soviet Union we can construct aeroplanes which will be far in advance of anything the capitalists possess*". [Applause.] (*Pravda*, Feb. 4, 1935.)

In respect to *tanks*—this powerful weapon of attack and assault on land, Comrade Tukhachevski gave the following figures: increase in the number of tankettes by 2,475 per cent, light tanks by 760 per cent and medium tanks by 729 per cent. At the same time the speed of the tanks has increased three to six times. The Red Army has greatly strengthened and modernized its artillery, communications and navy.

The Red Army is strong and powerful not only as a result of its technical equipment, which is excellent in all respects, but also because *this technical equipment is manned by splendid people—workers and collective farmers who are solid for their class, who are deeply loyal to the Communist Party and the proletarian revolution.*

Communists and Y.C.L.ers constitute 49.3 per cent of the strength of the Red Army; 68.3 per cent of the commanders are Communists and Y.C.L.ers.

Faced with the open and widespread preparations of Japanese imperialism and German fascism to attack the U.S.S.R., the latter has been compelled to increase the strength of its army to 940,000 and to

erect lines of defensive fortifications along its land frontiers and sea approaches.

The tremendous extent of the work done to increase the defensive power of the country compelled the Soviet Government to increase the budget appropriations for the Commissariat of Defense in 1934 to the sums of 5,000 million rubles as compared with the sum of 1,665 millions which had originally been voted. For the year of 1935, the appropriations amount to 6,500 millions. The toiling masses throughout the world should take note that in spite of the increase in the sums allotted by the budget to strengthen the defensive power of the U.S.S.R., and to maintain the Red Army, these sums amount to only 10 per cent of the total budget for 1935 (as against 10.5 per cent in 1934).

As compared with the expenditure incurred on maintaining the armies in the capitalist countries, that incurred for defensive purposes in the U.S.S.R. occupies a very humble place. Thus, of the Japanese budget, 38.5 per cent went to the army and navy in 1932-33, in Poland (1933-34) 13.6 per cent, in Germany 13.3 per cent and Great Britain (1934-35) 15.6 per cent of the respective budgets.

If war pensions are taken into account the proportion of the allocations by the budgets for the armies and navies in the capitalist countries is much higher, in England amounting to 21.6 per cent, in Germany to 34.8 per cent and in Poland to 39.2 per cent.

The Red Army men and Red Army commanders are successfully learning the use of their fighting technique, and the complicated forms of modern warfare.

> *"Our workers' and Peasants' Red Army is strong,"* said Comrade Tukhachevski. *"Its political power, its revolutionary power are invincible, and this requires that we shall be able to carry on the struggle in such a way as to utilize our technique so that there will be no army equal to our Red Army in this sphere as well."*

This statement made by the Assistant Commissar of Defense was drowned in the applause of the delegate of the Congress. The workers and toilers of the Soviet Union do not conceal the efforts they are making to strengthen the Red Army. They know that the many years of struggle carried on by the Soviet Union for peace—from the first decree on peace it proclaimed the day after the October victory, to the insistent and consistent proposals it has made in subsequent years for complete disarmament and the creation of a safety system, is all known to the workers and toilers in all countries. The mighty Red Army of the Soviet Union is only dangerous to those who are preparing war against the international fatherland of the toilers. The Red Army is a tremendous factor in the struggle for the maintenance of peace, a mighty force which retards the outbreak of new imperialist wars and intervention.

At the same time, the Red Army is the army of the world proletarian revolution. It surrounds the Socialist Republic of Soviets, the citadel of the world revolution, with an impregnable wall, and is thereby fighting for the triumph of Communism throughout the world.

Trained in the spirit of the deepest love for the workers who are pining in the fetters of capitalism in the capitalist countries, for the toilers of the colonies, and imbued with a lofty spirit of internationalism to the center of its being, it is the foremost armed detachment of the workers and toilers of the whole world. In characterizing the special features of the Red Army which distinguish it from the armies of capitalist countries, Comrade Stalin said that:

> *"The strength of our Red Army lies in the fact that from the first day of its existence it has been educated in the spirit of internationalism, in the spirit of respect for other peoples, in the spirit of respect for the workers of all countries, in the spirit of preserving and consolidating peace between nations. And for the very reason that our army is trained in the spirit of internationalism, in the spirit of the unity of the interests of the workers of all countries, our army is the army of the world revolution, the army of the workers of all countries."*

THE RED ARMY AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The toiling masses of the U.S.S.R. have a warm and unlimited love for their army. The Red Army is also loved by the proletariat and the exploited masses of peasants throughout the whole world. The victories of the Red Army in the civil war are known to the toilers of all countries. The international importance of the civil war is tremendous. The Red Army defended the fatherland of the international proletariat during the civil war, no matter on what front or against what enemy it fought.

The lessons of the civil war must be made known to the broadest masses of the toilers in all countries, and primarily to the members of the Communist Parties in capitalist countries. The proletariat in capitalist countries who study the lessons and the experiences of the civil war will arm and inspire themselves for the coming struggle for the world proletarian revolution.

An end must be put to the situation in the Communist Parties where military work lags behind to some extent. Without abandoning resolutions, meetings and demonstrations in connection with anti-imperialist propaganda, the Parties have to pass on to everyday detailed work in the armament factories, in the armies, navies, ports, etc. The objective possibilities exist—all that is required is that the boldest use is made of these possibilities.

The danger of war must be tirelessly explained to the masses, and propagandists and agitators have to be specially trained for the fulfillment of this task.

> "The people must be told of the real conditions of the great secret in which war is engendered, and how helpless are the ordinary organizations of the workers, even though they call themselves revolutionary, in face of the war which is really approaching."*

* Lenin. Vol. XXVII, p. 372, Russ. Ed.

In the capitalist countries chauvinist sentiments are still powerful. Again and again they are inflamed by the fascist elements who are openly preparing the masses for a new war. The task of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries is to organize the struggle against chauvinism and nationalism, and to improve international education.

The entire fighting experience of the Red Army and its historic forerunners—the workers' fighting detachments, the Red guards—shows that the proletariat can utilize the revolutionary situation and be victorious if it creates its *own* organized and firmly welded armed forces, only by breaking and destroying the military apparatus of the bourgeois States and by creating their own firm workers' and peasants' Red Armies, can the proletariat in the various countries *defend* the gains of the revolution from the frantic attempts of the dispossessed bourgeoisie to restore their rule.

In spite of the treacherous activity of Social-Democracy, directed against arming the toilers, against the formation of a Red Army, in spite of the calumniations of our enemies to the effect that Communists are Blanquists, the idea of establishing their own armed forces is penetrating more and more into the minds of the broad masses of workers and toilers throughout the whole world, as a result of the victories and experiences of the struggle of the Red Army in the U.S.S.R. The experiences of the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat and the revolutionary peasants show that the toilers cannot conduct a successful struggle for their own Soviet Power unless they establish their own armed forces, and there can be no struggle to consolidate Soviet power unless a firm and disciplined workers' and peasants' Red army has been formed. Such an attempt was made by the working class in Soviet Hungary, and Soviet Bavaria (1919). But is it not a fact that the insufficiently organized character of the armed forces was one of the causes for the defeat of the Hungarian Soviet Republic? And is it not a fact that the existence of Soviet China which is successfully hurling back the sixth campaign of the combined forces of Chinese and international counter-revolution, is a new and brilliant proof of the mighty vital force of the revolution which has been able to create its own well-organized armed forces? The heroic armed struggle which the miners of Asturias (Spain), in spite of all the weaknesses of their leaders, carried on for many days against the superior forces of the government troops, showed the power which the armed forces of the revolution are capable of displaying, if given correct organization and leadership.

Persistent work in the armies and navies, work in winning the soldiers of the bourgeois armies to the side of the revolution, the struggle against the real danger of a new war against the U.S.S.R., propaganda with a view to creating an atmosphere of love and sympathy for the Red Army—the faithful defender of the U.S.S.R. and the toilers throughout the world—these are the fighting tasks facing the Communists in all countries.

Stalin and the Red Army

By K. VOROSHILOV

THE period of peaceful construction in our history is fraught with events of vast significance. During recent years not rivers, but whole oceans, have flowed by. Enormous changes have taken place around us; entirely new prospects lie before us, and recognized scales and dimensions have completely changed. With all these events are indissolubly connected the many-sided revolutionary activities of Comrade Stalin. During the last five or six years, Comrade Stalin has stood at the very focus of increasing and turbulent struggle. Only these circumstances can fully explain the fact that the significance of Comrade Stalin, as one of the most prominent organizers of our final victory in the civil war, has to a certain extent been overshadowed, and has not yet received the estimation due to it.

Today, on the fiftieth birthday of our friend, I want, as far as I am able, to fill up this gap.

Naturally, in a short article, I cannot pretend to be giving a full characterization of the military work of Comrade Stalin. I want just to try to refresh in comrades' minds certain facts out of the most distant past, to publish certain little known documents, in order, by simple facts, to show the truly exceptional role played by Comrade Stalin at the most tense moments of the Civil War.

During the 1918-1920 period, Comrade Stalin was probably the only person whom the Central Committee despatched from one fighting front to another, choosing always those places most fraught with danger for the revolution. Where it was comparatively quiet, and everything was going smoothly, where we had successes, Stalin was not to be found. But where for various reasons the Red Army was cracking up, where the counter-revolutionary forces through their successes were menacing the very existence of the Soviet Government, where confusion and panic might any moment develop into helplessness, catastrope, there Stalin made his appearance. He took no sleep at night, he organized, he took the leadership into his own strong hands, he relentlessly broke through difficulties, and turned the corner, saved the situation. Stalin himself wrote about it in one of his letters to the Central Committee in 1919, saying that "he was being transformed into a specialist for cleaning out the stables of the war department".

TSARITSIN

Comrade Stalin began his military work on the Tsaritsin front more or less by chance. In the beginning of June, 1918, Comrade Stalin with a detachment of Red soldiers and two armored cars, set

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* Reprinted from *The Life of Stalin*—A Symposium. Published by Workers Library Publishers. 1930.

out for Tsaritsyn as director of food supplies for South Russia. In Tsaritsyn he was met with inconceivable chaos and not only in the Soviets, trade unions and Party organizations; there was even more muddle and confusion in the organs of military command. Comrade Stalin at every step came across obstacles of a general nature which prevented him from fulfilling the task for which he was directly responsible. These obstacles were due, first and foremost, to the rapid development of the Cossack counter-revolution, which was in those days receiving abundant assistance from the German troops in occupation in the Ukraine. The Cossack counter-revolutionary bands soon seized several points near Tsaritsyn, and thus not only defeated the plans for the collection of grain for the starving populations of Moscow and Leningrad, but also created a serious menace to Tsaritsyn itself.

The position was no better in other places at that time. In Moscow there was a rebellion of the Left Social-Revolutionaries! Muraviev had betrayed us in the East; in the Urals, the Czechoslovak counter-revolution was increasing; in the far South the British were approaching Baku. Civil war was raging in a fiery circle. The revolution was being put to its greatest test. Telegram after telegram flew from Comrade Stalin in Tsaritsyn to Lenin, and back. Lenin warned him of the dangers, expressed approval, demanded that determined measures be taken. The position in Tsaritsyn became one of tremendous significance. With the rebellion on the Don and the loss of Tsaritsyn, we risked losing the whole of the rich grain-producing districts of North Caucasus. And Comrade Stalin understood this only too well. As an experienced revolutionary, he soon came to the conviction that his work would have some meaning only if he could influence the military commanders, whose role in the circumstances of the moment was decisive.

"The line to the south of Tsaritsyn is not yet restored," he wrote to Lenin in a note dated July 7, sent with the characteristic inscription: "Hurrying to the front, can only write on business."

> "I am driving and railing at all who require it. Hope soon to restore the position! You can rest assured that we shall spare nobody, ourselves or others, and the grain will be obtained. If only our military 'specialists' (cobblers!) would not sleep and idle, the line would not have been broken; and if we restore the line, it will not be thanks to the officers, but in spite of them."

And later, answering the anxiety of Lenin about the possibility of a rising of Left Social-Revolutionaries in Tsaritsyn, he wrote briefly and to the point:

> "As for the hysterical ones, rest assured, our hand will not falter, we shall deal as enemies with our enemies."

As he became closer and closer in touch with the military apparatus, Comrade Stalin became convinced of its absolute helplessness, and in certain sections of its direct unwillingness to organize resistance to the ever more insolent counter-revolution.

By July 11, 1918, Stalin found it necessary to telegraph to Lenin:

> "Everything is complicated by the fact that the Headquarters Staff of the North Caucasus Command has proved to be absolutely incapable of fighting against the counter-revolution. It is not only that our 'specialists' are psychologically incapable of striking a decisive blow against the counter-revolution, but also that they, as 'staff' workers, are capable only of 'drafting plans' and elaborating schemes of reorganization, but are entirely indifferent to military operations . . . and generally speaking, behave as though they were outsiders, guests. The military commissars could not fill up the gap."

Comrade Stalin did not limit himself to this crushing description; in the same note he himself draws the organizational conclusions:

> "I consider I have no right merely to observe this with indifference, when Kalnin's front (Kalnin was the commander at that time of the North Caucasas) is cut off from supplies, and the North cut off from the grain district. I intend altering this and many other shortcomings in the localities; I shall take measures even to the dismissal of those officials and commanders who are ruining the cause, despite the formal difficulties which, where necessary, I shall break through. Of course, I shall take full responsibility before all higher institutions."

The position became more and more strained. Comrade Stalin exercised enormous energy, and in the shortest possible time developed out of extraordinary plenipotentiary for food supplies into the actual leader of all the Red forces in the Tsaritsyn front. This state of affairs was recognized in Moscow, and Comrade Stalin was given the work of "restoring order, amalgamating detachments into regular army units, appointing the proper authorities, and driving out all the undisciplined." *

By this time the remnants of the Ukrainian revolutionary armies, which had retreated before the attacks of the German troops across the Don steppes, had arrived in Tsaritsyn.

Comrade Stalin headed the newly created Revolutionary Military Council, which began its work of organizing a regular army. The turbulent nature of Comrade Stalin, his energy and will power, did that which yesterday had seemed impossible. In the shortest possible time divisions, brigades, regiments were created. The staff organs of supply and the whole rear were radically cleansed of counter-revolutionary and alien elements. The Soviet and Party apparatus were improved, and their work tightened up. A group of old Bolsheviks and revolutionary workers rallied round Comrade Stalin, and in the place of the helpless Staff, a Red Bolshevik citadel grew up in the South, at the very gates of the Don counter-revolution.

Tsaritsyn at that time was full of counter-revolutionaries of all

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* From the telegram of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic countersigned: "This telegram is despatched by agreement with Lenin".

kinds, from Right Social-Revolutionaries and terrorists to double-barreled monarchists. All these gentlemen, before the arrival of Comrade Stalin and the revolutionary units from the Ukraine, had felt almost free, and lived in the hope of better days. To insure the reorganization of the Red forces on the front, it was necessary to sweep out the rear with an iron, relentless broom. The revolutionary Military Council, headed by Comrade Stalin, created a special Cheka,* and entrusted it with the duty of cleansing Tsaritsyn from counter-revolution.

The evidence of an enemy is sometimes valuable and interesting. This is how Colonel Nosovich (former Chief of the Operations Department of the army), who later betrayed us and went over to Krasnov, describes this period and the role of Stalin, in a White Guard magazine—*The Don Wave*—of February 3, 1919:

> "The chief work given to Stalin was the organization of food supplies to the northern provinces, and he was possessed of unlimited powers for the carrying out of this task. . . . The Griazi-Tsaritsyn line was cut for good. In the North there remained one possibility of getting supplies and maintaining connections: through the Volga. In the South, after the occupation of Tikhoretskaya by White Volunteers, the position became exceedingly precarious. As for Stalin, who drew his supplies exclusively from the Stavropol province, this state of affairs threatened an end to his mission in the South. But it was obviously not in the nature of such a person as Stalin to leave unfinished work once begun. We must be fair to him, and admit that any of the old administrators have good cause to envy his energy; and it would be well for many others to learn from his capacity to adapt himself to this work, and the local circumstances. Gradually, as his work became less, or, rather, as his direct tasks became smaller, Stalin began to examine the work of all the administrative departments of the town, and the task of organizing the defense of Tsaritsyn in particular, and the whole of the Caucasian, so-called revolutionary, front in general."

Further, describing the position in Tsaritsyn, Nosovich writes:

> "By this time the atmosphere had become heavy at Tsaritsyn. The Tsaritsyn Cheka was working at full speed. Not a day passed without plots being discovered in what had seemed to be the most reliable and secret places. All the prisons of the town were full. . . .
>
> "The fighting at the front had reached its culminating point. . . .
>
> "After July 20, the chief moving spirit and executor was Stalin. A simple conversation on the direct line with the center, concerning the difficulties and unsuitability for work of the existing form of administration, brought a command along the main wire from Moscow that Stalin was to take charge of the whole of the military . . . and civil administration. . . ."

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* Cheka—Extraordinary Committee, used for dealing with counter-revolutionary elements during the Revolution and civil war.

But Nosovich himself admits later that these repressive measures were well founded. This is what he writes of the counter-revolutionary organizations in Tsaritsyn:

> "By this time the local counter-revolutionary organizations also, who adopted the Constituent Assembly as their motto, had become considerably strengthened and, having obtained money from Moscow, were preparing an insurrection to help the Don Cossacks to free Tsaritsyn.
>
> "Unfortunately, the leaders of this organization who had arrived from Moscow, Engineer Alexeyev and his two sons, were not well acquainted with the existing state of affairs, and, as a result of a badly arranged plan, which included bringing into the ranks of the active participators a Serbian battalion, which had lately served the Bolsheviks in the Extraordinary Committee, the organization of this plot was discovered. . . .
>
> "Stalin's resolution was short: 'To be shot'!
>
> "Engineer Alexeyev, his two sons, and a considerable number of officers with them, some of whom had been members of the organization while others were suspected of participation in it, were seized by the Cheka and shot without trial."

Regarding the raid and the work of cleansing the rear (North Caucasian Command Headquarters and its administrative offices) from White Guards, Nosovich writes further:

> "A characteristic peculiarity of this drive was the attitude of Stalin to instructions wired from the center. When Trotsky, worried because of the destruction of the command administrations formed by him with such difficulty, sent a telegram concerning the necessity of leaving the staff and the war commissariat on the previous footing and giving them a chance to work, Stalin wrote a categorical, most significant inscription on the telegram: 'To be ignored!'
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> "No attention was paid therefore to this telegram, and the entire artillery and a section of the staff personnel continued to wait on barges at Tsaritsyn."

The whole face of Tsaritsyn was very shortly quite unrecognizable. The town, where so recently military bands played in the public gardens, where the streets had been crowded with the bourgeoisie and White officers who had floated in, now became a Red military camp, where the strictest order and military discipline reigned over all. This reinforcement of the rear immediately produced the desired effect upon the morale of our regiments fighting at the front. The commanders and political staff, and the entire Red Army rank and file, began to feel that a strong revolutionary hand was leading them, which would carry on the struggle in the interests of the workers and peasants, mercilessly punishing all those who stood in the way of that struggle.

The leadership of Comrade Stalin was not limited to work in his study. When the necessary order had been restored, when revo-

lutionary organizations had been put into order, he set out for the front, which then stretched over 600 kilometers.*

And only Stalin, with his magnificent organizational capacities, was able, having had no previous military training (Comrade Stalin had never served in any army!), so well to understand special military questions in the then extremely difficult circumstances.

I remember, as though it were today, the beginning of August 1918. The Krasnov Cossacks were attacking Tsaritsyn, trying with one concentrated drive to throw back the Red Army units to the Volga. For many days the Red troops, headed by the Communist division composed entirely of workers from the Donetz Basin, withstood the extremely powerful attacks of the excellently organized Cossack units.

These were days of great trial. You should have seen Comrade Stalin at that time. Calm as usual, deep in thought, he literally had no sleep for days on end, distributing his intensive work between the fighting positions and the Army Headquarters. The position at the front became almost catastrophic. The Krasnov troops, commanded by Fitzhalaurov, Mamontov and others, by a well-planned maneuver, were pressing our exhausted troops, who had already suffered great losses. The enemy front, formed into a horseshoe, with its flanks resting on the Volga, pressed closer every day. We had no way out. But Stalin cared nothing for this. He was inspired with one single thought—victory! To smash up the enemy whatever happened. And this indomitable will of Stalin was passed on to his closest colleagues, and despite the almost hopeless position, nobody doubted in our ultimate victory.

We were victorious. The enemy was beaten and thrown far back in the direction of the Don.

PERM

At the end of 1918 a disastrous situation arose on the Eastern front, and particularly on the sector of the Third Army, which had been compelled to surrender Perm. This army, surrounded by the enemy in a semi-circle, was finally demoralized toward the end of November. As a result of six months' continuous fighting, in the absence of any reliable reinforcements, with a weak rear, the food supply in a hopeless condition (the Twenty-Ninth Division stood out for five days literally without a piece of bread), in 35 degrees of frost, with no roads, along a huge, drawn-out front (more than 400 kilometers), with a poor staff, the army was not in a condition to stand out against the excellent forces of the enemy.

To get the full, disconsolate picture, one must add the mass desertions of the "old" officers, and the surrender of whole regiments, as a result of the poor class selection of reinforcements and the futility of the Army command. The Third Army, in such circumstances, broke to pieces entirely, retreated in disorder over a distance of 300 kilometers in twenty days, and lost on the way eighteen thousand soldiers, dozens of guns, hundreds of machine-guns, etc.

* A kilometer is approximately five-eights of a mile.

The enemy began to advance rapidly, seriously menacing Viatka and the entire Eastern front.

The Central Committee was compelled, as a result of these events, to consider the causes of these catastrophes and bring the Third Army into order again. Whom to send to fulfill this difficult task? Lenin telegraphed to the President of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republics:

> "There are several party dispatches from Perm concerning the catastrophic condition of the army and drunkenness. I propose sending Stalin—am afraid Smilga would not be firm enough in his attitude toward . . . who also, it is said, drinks and cannot restore order."

The Central Committee took its decision:

> "To appoint a Party Investigation Commission, composed of members of the Central Committee Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, to minutely investigate the causes of the surrender of Perm, the recent defeats on the Ural front, and also all circumstances connected with the incidents indicated. The Central Committee instructs the Commission to take all necessary measures for the speedy restoration both of the Party and Soviet work in the whole region of the Third and Second Armies." *

This decision apparently limited the functions of Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky to an "investigation of the causes of the surrender of Perm and the recent defeats on the Ural front". But Comrade Stalin made the center of his "Party investigation" work the taking of actual measures to restore the position, to reinforce the front, etc. In his first telegram to Lenin, of January 5, 1919, concerning the results of the work of the Commission, Stalin said nothing about the "causes of the catastrophe", but raises the question on the spot of what must be done to save the army. This was his telegram:

> "To the President of the Council of Defense, Comrade Lenin.
>
> "The investigation has begun. How the investigation goes on we shall inform you from time to time. For the time being we consider it necessary to inform you of one requirement of the Third Army which brooks no delay. The point is that out of 30,000 previously in the army, there remain only about 11,000 tired, exhausted men, who can scarcely hold out against the attacks of the enemy. The units sent by the Commander-in-Chief are not reliable, some are even hostile to us, and need seriously combing out. To save the remnants of the Third Army and avert the rapid advance of the enemy towards Viatka (according to reports received from the commanders at the front and the Third Army, this is a very real danger) it is absolutely necessary to send immediately from Russia at the disposal of the Army Commander at least three absolutely reliable regiments. We ur-

* Telegram of Sverdlov. No. 00079.

gently request you to bring pressure to bear in this direction on the military institutions concerned. We repeat: without such measures the fate of Perm awaits Viatka; this is the general opinion of the comrades on the spot, which we share on the basis of all the information at our disposal. (Sgd.) Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, 5th January, 1919, Viatka."

It was not until January 13, 1919, that Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky sent their short preliminary report on the "causes of the catastrophe" which amounted in short to the following: weariness and exhaustion of the army at the moment of the enemy attack, absence of reserves, absence of connections between th staff and the army, the disorganized methods of the Army Commander, the outrageous and criminal methods of controlling the front employed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which actually paralyzed the front with its contradictory instructions, and which deprived it of every possibility of coming to the speedy assistance of the Third Army, the unreliability of reinforcements from the rear, which is explained by the old methods of formation, and the absolute instability of the rear, consequent upon the complete helplessness and incapacity of the Soviet and Party organizations.

Simultaneously Comrade Stalin indicated, and put into immediate practice with his usual speed and determination, several practical measures to raise the fighting capacity of the Third army.

"By January 15th, we read in his report to the Council of Defense, 1,200 reliable infantry and cavalrymen have been sent to the front; a day later, two squadrons of cavalry. January 20th, the Sixty-Second regiment, Third brigade (after being carefully combed out). These reinforcements made it possible to stop the advance of the enemy, roused the spirits of the Third army, and opened up the way for an attack on the Perm, which up to now has been successful. In the rear of the army a serious cleansing of the Soviet and Party institutions is taking place. In Viatka and other provincial towns revolutionary committees have been organized. The formation of strong revolutionary organizations has been begun in the villages and still continues. The entire Party and Soviet work is being reorganized on a new basis. The military control department has been cleansed and reorganized. The provincial Extraordinary Commission has also been cleansed and reinforced by new Party workers. The unloading at the Viatka Junction is proceeding, etc. . . ."

As a result of these measures, not only was the further advance of the enemy stopped, but in January, 1919, the Eastern front took the offensive and on our right flank Hralsk was taken.

This is how Comrade Stalin understood and carried out his task of "investigating the causes of the catastrophe". He investigated, he discovered the causes, and there on the spot, with the forces at his disposal, made an end of the trouble and brought about the necessary change of heart.

PETROGRAD

In the spring of 1919 the White Army of General Yudenich, in accordance with the task set him by Kolchak of "taking Petrograd" and drawing away the revolutionary troops from the Eastern front, began an unexpected attack, with the help of White Esthonians, White Finns and the British, and became a real menace to Petrograd. The seriousness of the situation was the more marked by the fact that in Petrograd itself counter-revolutionary plots were discovered, the leaders of which were military specialists serving on the staff of the Western Front, in the Seventh army and the Kronstadt naval base. Parallel with the attack of Yudenich on Petrograd, Bulak-Balahovitch was gaining several successes in the direction of Pskov. Treachery began on the front. Several of our regiments went over to the enemy: the whole garrison of "Red Hill" fort and "Grey Horse" fort openly came out against the Soviet Government. The whole Seventh army lost its head, the front wavered, the enemy had advanced almost to Petrograd. It was necessary to save the situation immediately.

The Ceneral Committee again chose Comrade Stalin for this work. In the course of three weeks, Comrade Stalin succeeded in stemming the tide. The low spirits and confusion of the army units were quickly liquidated; the staffs were pulled together, mobilizations of the Petrograd workers and Communists took place one after another, the enemies and traitors were mercilessly annihilated. Comrade Stalin interfered in the operations of the military command. This is what he telegraphed to Lenin:

> "On the heels of 'Red Hill' we have liquidated 'Grey Horse'; their big guns are in complete working order; there is taking place a rapid [illegible] of all forts and strongholds. The naval specialists assured us that the capture of 'Red Hill' from the sea would overthrow all naval science. There is nothing left for me but mourn the loss of this so-called science. The speedy capture of the 'Hill' was the result of the most brutal interference on my part, and of civilians genenerally, in the operations, including the cancelling of orders on land and sea, and giving our own instructions. I consider it my duty to declare that I shall continue to act in this way, despite all my reverence for science.—Stalin."

Six days later Comrade Stalin reported to Lenin:

> "The turning point in our units has arrived. For a week there has been no single case of individual or group desertion. The deserters are returning in thousands. There are more frequent desertions from the enemy to our camp. In a week 400 men have deserted to us, the majority with their weapons. We began the attack yesterday afternoon. Although the promised reinforcements have not yet arrived, it was impossible for us to remain on the line we occupied—it was too close to Petrograd. The attack so far is successful; the Whites are running; today we took the line Kernovo-Voronino-Slepino-Kaskovo. We have taken prisoners, two or more guns, automatics, cartridges. The enemy ships have

not appeared, they apparently fear the 'Red Hill' which is now entirely ours. Urgently send the two million cartridges for the Sixth division."

These two telegrams give a full picture of the huge creative work done by Comrade Stalin in liquidating the most perilous situation before Red Petrograd.

THE SOUTHERN FRONT

The autumn of 1919 is remembered by all. The decisive turning point in the whole civil war was about to take place. Supplied by the "Allies", supported by their Staffs, the White troops of Denikin advanced on Orel. The entire huge southern front, slowly, step by step, was falling back. The inner situation was no less difficult. The food supply difficulties had become extreme. Industry was coming to a standstill for lack of fuel. Inside the country, and even in Moscow, counter-revolutionary elements were stirring. Danger threatened Tula, danger hung over Moscow.

The situation had to be saved. And to the Southern front, once again, the Central Committee sent Comrade Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. There is no need now to hide the fact that prior to his appointment, Stalin put three important conditions to the Central Committee:

1. That Trotsky should not interfere in the affairs of the Southern front, and should not cross its boundary line.
2. That a number of workers, whom Comrade Stalin considered unsuitable for the work of restoring the position among the troops, were to be immediately withdrawn, and
3. That new workers, to be chosen by Comrade Stalin, should be immediately despatched to the Southern front, who would be capable of fulfilling the task.

These conditions were accepted in their entirety.

But, in order to cover this huge expanse (from Volga to the Polish-Ukrainian frontier), calling itself the Southern front, composed of several hundred thousand troops, an accurate plan of operations was necessary, a clearly formulated objective for the front had to be drawn up. Then this objective could be presented to the troops and, by regroupings and concentrating the best forces in the most important places, it would be possible to deliver a blow at the enemy.

Comrade Stalin found a very indefinite and difficult state of affairs at the front. We were being beaten on the main line of Kursk-Orel-Tula; the eastern flank was helplessly marking time. As for the plan of operations, he was offered the old (September) plan of making the principal attack on the left flank, between Tsaritsyn and Novorossisk, across the Don Steppes.

"The main plan of attack of the Southern front remains unchanged; namely, the main blow will be delivered by the special

group of Shorin, with the object of annihilating the enemy on the Don and in Kuban." *

Having acquainted himself with the position Comrade Stalin immediately took his decision. He categorically rejected the old plan, drew up new suggestions and proposed them to Lenin in the following note, which speaks for itself. The note itself is of such interest, so clearly shows the strategic talents of Comrade Stalin, is so characteristic in its decisive method of dealing with questions, that we consider it valuable to quote it in full:

> "Two months ago the Commander-in-Chief made no objection in principle to a drive from the west to the east, through the Donetz Basin, as the main task. If the blow was not delivered, it was only because he referred to the 'heritage' left by the retreat of the Southern troops in the summer, *i.e.*, the spontaneously created grouping of troops on the south-eastern front, the rearrangement of which (grouping) would result in much loss of time, to the advantage of Denikin. . . . But now the circumstances and the resulting grouping of forces have changed fundamentally; the Eighth army (the main force on the late southern front) has moved towards the Southern front and faces the Donetz Basin; the cavalry corps of Budenny (the other main force) has moved to the Southern front, and a new force has been added, the Lettish division, which in a month's time, refreshed, will again be a menace to Denikin's forces. . . . What then makes the Commander-in-Chief (Headquarters) cling to the old plan? Apparently obstinacy alone, or if you like, factionalism of the most stupid and most dangerous kind to the Republic cultivated in the Commander-in-Chief by his 'strategic adviser'.
>
> ". . . a few days ago Shorin was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to make an attack on Novorossisk across the Don steppes, along a line which might be convenient for flight by our airmen, but is quite impossible for our infantry and artillery to wander over. There is no need to prove that this hare-brained (proposed) advance into the midst of a population hostile to us, with absolutely no roads, threatens us with utter defeat. It can be easily understood that this advance on the Cossack villages, as was shown in practice recently, can only rally the Cossacks against us to the side of Denikin, in the defense of their villages; can only put Denikin in the position of Saviour of the Don; can only result in the creation of an army of Cossacks for Denikin; in other words, can only strengthen Denikin's position. It is just for this reason that it is essential now, without delay, to change the old plan which has already been changed in practice, and to replace it by a plan for a main blow through Kharkov—the Donetz to Rostov; here, firstly, we shall be among a sympathetic, and not a hostile population, which will simplify our movements; secondly, we will gain thereby a most important railway system (Donetz), and the main artery feeding Denikin's army, the Voronezh-Rostov line.

* From instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, September, 1919.

"Thirdly, by such a movement, we cut Denikin's army in two, leaving the Volunteers to be eaten up by Makhno, while we threaten the Cossack armies, with an attack from the rear. Fourthly, we get a chance of creating trouble between the Cossacks and Denikin, since the latter, should our advance be successful, will try to move the Cossack units to the west, which the majority of Cossacks will refuse to do. . . . Fifthly, we get coal, and Denikin remains without coal. There must be no delay in adopting this plan. . . . In short: the old plan, which is already no longer being acted upon, must not be galvanized into life under any circumstances; it is a danger to the Republic, and will certainly ease Denikin's position. The new plan must take its place. Circumstances and conditions here are not only ready for this, but urgently demand a change. . . . Without this my work on the Southern front is simply futile, criminal, useless; which gives me the right, or rather forces me to go anywhere, to the devil even, rather than remain on the Southern front.—Yours, Stalin."

This document requires no comment. The measure by which Stalin estimates the shortest route to attain the goal deserves particular attention. In the Civil War simple arithmetic is not enough, and often is incorrect. The road from Tsaritsyn to Novorossisk may turn out to be much longer because it goes through an environment of class enemies. On the other hand the road from Tula to Novorossisk may prove much shorter, because it goes through working class Kharkov and through the miners of the Donetz Basin. In Stalin's estimation of the correct direction can be seen his main qualities as a proletarian revolutionary, a real strategist of the Civil War.

Stalin's plan was accepted by the Central Committee. Lenin himself, with his own hand, wrote the order to the Field Headquarters for the immediately withdrawal of the obsolete instructions. The chief blow was directed by the Southern front in the direction of Kharkov-Donetz Basin-Rostov. The results are well known: the turning point in the Civil War was passed.. Denikin's hordes were pushed into the Black Sea. Ukraine and North Caucasus were freed from the White Guards. In all these events we find the magnificent services of Comrade Stalin.

It is worth while to dwell also on one important historical moment connected with the name of Comrade Stalin on the Southern front. I have in mind the formation of the Cavalry Army. This was the first attempt to bring together cavalry units into such a large unit as an army. Stalin saw the might of a cavalry mass in the Civil War. He concretely understood its great significance as far as a crushing maneuver. But nobody had in the past had the peculiar experience of a cavalry army in operation. Nowhere was such an experience to be found in modern scientific works either. Consequently such an idea called forth either astonishment or direct antagonism. But this was not Stalin: once convinced of the usefulness and correctness of his plan, he always plunged into the work of accomplishing it. So on November 11th, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Re-

public received the following report from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern front:

> "To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
>
> "The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern front, at its meeting on November 11th, on the basis of existing conditions, has decided to form a Cavalry Army of the First and Second Cavalry Corps and one Rifle Brigade (later on to add a second brigade).
>
> "The composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry Army to be: Commander—Comrade Budenny; and members—Comrades Voroshilov and Schadenko.
>
> "Authority: Decision of Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, November 11, 1919. No. 505-a.
>
> "We request your confirmation."

The Cavalry Army was created, despite the wishes of the Center. The initiative for its creation belongs to Comrade Stalin, who quite clearly saw all the necessity for such an organization. The historic consequences of this step are well known to everyone.

And one more characteristic was shown absolutely clearly on the Southern front—Stalin's way of working with "shock troops", his way of choosing the main direction for the army to take, concentrating the best sections of the army, and crushing the enemy. In this respect, and also in the selection of the direction for the army to take, Stalin achieved great sikll.

After the rout of Denikin, the authority of Stalin as a first class organizer and military leader became indisputable. When in January, 1920, as a result of serious mistakes on the part of our command at the front, our offensive was seriously held up near Rostov, when again the danger was imminent of the White Guards recovering from the blow, reducing our successes to nil, the Central Committee sent Stalin the following telegram:

> "In view of the necessity of instituting genuine unity among the commanders on the Caucasus front, of supporting the authority of the front commanders and the army commander, of utilizing as widely as possible local forces and resources, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has resolved that it is absolutely necessary that you enter the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front. . . . Inform us when you leave for Rostov."

Comrade Stalin conformed, although because of his health he considered he should not have been moved. Then he began to get anxious, feeling that this constant shifting from one place to another would be incorrectly interpreted by the local Party organizations, who would be inclined to "accuse me of frivolously jumping from one sphere of army activity to another, in view of the fact that they are not informed of the decisions of the Central Committee." *

The Central Committee agreed with Comrade Stalin, and Lenin

* Stalin's telegram of February 7, 1920.

on February 10 telegraphed him: "I have not yet lost hope that . . . everything will come right without your transferring."

When Wrangel, under cover of the White Polish campaign, crawled out of the Crimea and constituted a new terrible menace to the recently liberated Donetz, and the whole of the south, the C.C. passed the following resolution (August 3, 1920):

> "That, in view of Wrangel's successes and the alarm in Kuban, the Wrangel front be considered as of vast dependent importance, and be treated as an independent front. That Comrade Stalin be instructed to organize a Revolutionary Military Council, and to concentrate his entire forces on the Wrangel front, Egorov or Frunze to be appointed Commander of the Wrangel front, by agreement between the Commander-in-Chief and Stalin."

The same day Lenin wrote to Stalin:

> "The Political Bureau has just finished dividing up the fronts, so that you are engaged exclusively with Wrangel."

Comrade Stalin organized the new front, and relinquished his work only on account of sickness.

During the White Polish campaign, Comrade Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwest front. The rout of the Polish army, the liberation of Kiev and West Ukraine, the deep penetration into Galicia, the organization of the famous raid of the First Cavalry Army—Stalin's infant—to a large degree were the results of his competent, skillful leadership.

The rout of the entire Polish front in the Ukraine and the almost complete annihilation of the Third Polish Army near Kiev, the crushing blows near Berdichev and Zhitomir and the movement of the First Cavalry Army in the direction of Rovno, created circumstances favorable to a general attack along the whole of our Western front. The subsequent activities of the Southwestern front brought the Red troops up to the gates of Lvov. And only the defeat of our troops near Warsaw prevented the Cavalry Army from carrying out the attack planned upon Ivov, from which it was only ten kilometers distant.

However, this period is so rich in events, and to relate it all would require such a careful analysis of the documents concerned, that it would lead beyond the limits of our article.

This short account of the military activities of Comrade Stalin does not give even a complete idea of his fundamental characteristic qualities as a military leader and proletarian revolutionary. What is most apparent is Comrade Stalin's capacity of quickly grasping the concrete circumstances and acting in accordance with them. The most relentless enemy of mental slovenliness, indiscipline and individualism in warfare, Comrade Stalin, where the interests of the revolution so demanded, never hesitated to take upon himself the responsibility for exceptional measures, for radical changes; where the revolutionary situation so demanded, Comrade Stalin was ready to go against any regulations, any principle of subordination.

Comrade Stalin was always an advocate of the most strict mili-

tary discipline and centralization in conditions, however, of thoughtful, and steady direction on the part of the superior military organs. In the report given above to the Council of Defense on January 31, 1919, Comrade Dzerzhinsky wrote:

> "The army cannot work as an air-tight, entirely autonomous unit; in the actions it is entirely dependent upon adjacent armies and primarily upon the instructions of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: the best fighting army, other things being equal, would run the risk of crumpling up in the event of wrong instructions from the center and the absence of any live contact with the adjacent armies. A regime of strictly centralized action on the part of individual armies must be instituted on all fronts, and primarily on the eastern front, for the carrying out of definite, seriously thought out, strategic instructions. Arbitrary action and thoughtlessness in the defining of instructions, without a careful consideration of all data, and the rapid change in instructions necessitated thereby, and also the indefiniteness of instructions themselves, as the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic often lets pass. All this makes it impossible to lead the armies, causes waste of time and energy, and disorganizes the front."

Comrade Stalin always insisted on personal responsibility for work undertaken, and was physically incapable of tolerating "departmental red tape".

Comrade Stalin paid great attention to the organization of supplies to the troops. He knew and understood the meaning of good food and warm clothes for the soldiers. At Tsaritsyn and Perm, and on the Southern front, he left no stone unturned to guarantee supplies to the troops and thus make them stronger and steadier.

In Comrade Stalin we find the most typical features of the proletarian organizer of the class front. He paid special attention to the class composition of the army, to ensure that workers and such peasants indeed remained in it, "as do not exploit the labor of others". He attributed great importance to the development of political work in the army, and was more than once the initiator of the mobilization of Communists, considering it essential that a considerable percentage of them be sent as rank-and-file fighters. Comrade Stalin was very particular about the selection of military commissars. He strongly criticized the then existing All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars for sending "mere boys". He said:

> "Military Commissars should be the soul of military action, giving a lead to the experts." *

Comrade Stalin also attributed great importance to the political condition of the army rear. In his report on the Third Army, he writes:

> "The weak spot in our armies is the instability of the rear, chiefly due to neglect of Party work, incapacity of the

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* Telegram from Tsaritsyn, 1918.

Soviet departments to put into operation the instructions of the center, and the exclusive, almost isolated, position of the local extraordinary commissions."

Comrade Stalin was extremely strict on the question of the selection of personnel. Regardless of position, and genuinely being "no respector of persons", he swept away in the firmest way all useless experts, commissars, Party and Soviet workers. But at the same time, Stalin, more than anyone, always supported and defended those who, in his opinion, justified the revolutionary confidence in them. Comrade Stalin acted in his way with well-known Red Army commanders who were known to him personally. When one of the true proletarian heroes of the Civil War, afterwards Commander of the Fourteenth Cavalry Division, Comrade Parhomenko, killed in the struggle against the Makhno bandits, was, at the beginning of 1920, sentenced through a misunderstanding to capital punishment, Comrade Stalin, hearing of it, demanded his immediate, unconditional, release. Similar cases could be given in numbers.

Comrade Stalin, better than any of the other big leaders, knew how to appreciate deeply workers who had devoted their lives to the proletarian revolution; and the commanders knew this, as everyone else knew it who at any time under his leadership had carried on the struggle for our cause.

This was Comrade Stalin in the Civil War. He is still the same, and will remain the same in the years of struggle for Socialism to come.

The Civil War demanded an enormous expenditure of energy, will-power and brain-power from Comrade Stalin. He gave himself entirely and undividedly. But at the same time he gained in the Civil War great experience for his later work.

In the Civil War, in varying, complicated circumstances, Comrade Stalin, with an enormous talent for revolutionary strategy, always correctly estimated the chief directions to be taken for the main blow at the enemy; and skilfully using the tactical method appropriate to the circumstances, obtained the desired results. This quality of proletarian strategist and tactician has remained with him since the Civil War. This quality of his is well known to the whole Party. Trotsky and his friends could best relate about this, who have paid in full for the attempt to substitute their petty-bourgeois ideology for the great teachings of Marx and Lenin. The Right opportunists, who only quite recently suffered complete defeat, also know this only too well.

Comrade Stalin in peace time also, together with the Leninist Central Committee of the Party, is conducting a no less successful and relentless struggle against all the voluntary and involuntary enemies of the Party and of the building of Socialism in our country.

But at the same time, while long ago he ceased formally to be a military man, Comrade Stalin has never ceased to occupy himself most seriously with questions of the defense of the proletarian State. Now, as in past years, he knows the Red Army and is its nearest and dearest friend.

The Conditions for Establishing Soviet Districts in the Interior in Semi-Colonial Countries

By LI

(*A reply to Comrade Myro.*)

IN HIS article "The Struggle to Establish Inner Soviet Regions in the Semi-Colonial Countries" Comrade Myro presents one of the most acute problems facing the colonial revolution.

While disagreeing with the author on several of the problems raised in the article, we are in absolute agreement with him on the *main question.* We agree with Comrade Myro that under certain conditions the most probable "territorial differentiation" of the contending class forces, or to put it in other words, the "route" to be taken by the revolution in semi-colonial countries will to a certain extent resemble the "territorial differentiation" or "route" taken by the *Chinese* Revolution. This means that the revolution can be victorious first of all over a certain section of the territory of a given country, most probably in the interior of the country concerned, and that organs of revolutionary (Soviet) Power and a revolutionary army can be organized there, and to be followed only after a new relation of class forces (including the military forces) has been established by the extension of the revolution over the whole country or over the decisive districts. We also recognize that this peculiarity (the possibility not only of establishing but also of consolidating a number of revolutionary strongholds in the interior of semi-colonial countries for a relatively long period) provides the revolution with certain advantages which more than repay the *additional difficulties* inevitable when the revolution is victorious in relatively backward regions. Here we refer to regions with an overwhelming peasant population, and where the proletarian stratum of the population is a weak one, and is consequently weakly represented in the organs of power, in the revolutionary army and in the Party.

The establishment of such (Soviet) districts in the interior will be of immense (and perhaps of decisive) importance for the development of the revolution on a national scale.

Finally, we agree with Comrade Myro that the recognition of the possibility and moreover of the probability of the repetition of the Chinese way of the development of the revolution (through its victory first over a portion of the territory of a semi-colony) demands from the Communist Parties of the countries concerned that they work through all the necessary measures for the fulfillment of this possibility, including also measures of a military-technical character. The advice given by Comrade Myro regarding such preparations for the struggle to establish Soviet districts in the most favorable conditions is worthy of careful attention and study.

It is thus obvious that while disagreeing with Comrade Myro on essential points we nevertheless accept the *basis* of the problem as presented and elaborated by him.

FIRST REMARK

Comrade Myro presents the question of the possibility of establishing only *Soviet* districts, as though pre-supposing in advance that the revolutionary movements in all the colonies and semi-colonies have already reached the stage where the realization of the main slogan of the Communists, *viz.*, the slogan of Soviet Power, has become a practical question. In such a general form this is hardly correct.

It is true that the development of the Soviet, agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution in China has to a considerable extent changed the political situation throughout the whole of the colonial world. The toiling masses in other eastern countries are also beginning to accept the experiences of the Soviet Revolution in China. Thus, for example, the Soviets in Indo-China that grew out of the anti-imperialist and agrarian movement in 1932 originated under the direct influence of the Chinese Soviets.

On the other hand, the national-reformist bourgeoisie in all the colonial and semi-colonial countries also take into account the Chinese experiences. Faced with the danger of a new wave of the revolutionary movement "at home", the national-reformist bourgeoisie unite with the imperialists for joint counter-revolutionary struggle against the plebeian uprisings of the masses of the people, uprisings capable not only of overthrowing the domination of the imperialists and of the native landlords, but also of removing the bourgeoisie from participation in the government and to establish workers' and peasants' soviets along the lines of revolutionary China.

CHANGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE COLONIAL AND SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

However, it is not only and not even so much a question of the influence of the Chinese Soviets. Considerable class changes have taken place in the course of the development of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries during the years that have passed since the first round of colonial revolutions in these countries. These changes have taken place in a definite direction. *First of all, the national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in which the national bourgeoisie formerly played a leading role, are now developing in the main as movements of the toiling masses in which, though the peasantry are numerically superior, the proletariat plays an ever-growing political role and is carrying on a successful struggle to bring about its hegemony in these movements. Second,* the national-reformist bourgeoisie who still continue to exert influence over the masses, *are more and more exposing themselves* as a force which compromises and makes agreement with the imperialists, as a *counter-revolutionary* force irreconcilably hostile to a really consistent revolutionary struggle for the independence of

the colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism and for the sweeping away of the tremendous remnants of feudal barbarism from these countries. *Third*, the national-liberation movement *is becoming more and more interwoven with the agrarian-peasant revolution*, and is more and more clearly displaying a tendency to grow into a *national revolutionary war against imperialism.* It is thus being more and more closely connected with the proletarian revolutionary movement and is becoming *the most steadfast ally of the world proletarian revolution.*

Under these conditions it is absolutely clear that the slogan of Soviet Power must be the *chief* slogan of the Communists in the colonial countries. That is why in the "programs of action" of the Communist Parties of India, Indo-China, the Philippines, Egypt, the Arabian countries, etc., advance as their chief slogan of agitation and propaganda that of the struggle for Soviet Power in these countries. However, under definite conditions (more details of which will be given below), even in China, where the Soviets have been victorious and are carrying on the struggle over a considerable section of territory, namely, in Manchuria which has been torn away from China by Japanese imperialism, the Communists are refraining from advancing the slogan of Soviet Power as a *slogan of action*, and are calling for the organization of *an anti-imperialist, peoples'-revolutionary government.* This peoples'-revolutionary government is being established in territories occupied by partisans who are under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Similarly in Cuba where the Communist Party is operating under the slogan of the struggle for Soviet Power Soviets have not yet been established in a district occupied by the insurgent masses of workers and peasants, revolutionary power being operated by *Revolutionary Committees*, which are carrying out the slogans of the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolutions. In his article Comrade Myro points first and foremost to the districts in Southern and Caribbean America "populated mainly by Indian peasants" as possible districts for the establishment of Soviet Power. We understand, of course, that Comrade Myro cited these Indian regions simply as one of the possible examples, and that the selection of this example is of no decisive importance as far as his argument is concerned. But this example helps us to set the question to the effect that the *perspectives for the establishment of a revolutionary fighting ground in the colonial or semi-colonial countries must not essentially be linked up with the immediate establishment of Soviet Power.* In other words, the political situation, the degree of hegemony in the movement won by the proletariat, and the level of the class consciousness of the masses may as yet be *insufficient* for the establishment of a *Soviet* region. Nevertheless, *it may prove to be possible for a revolutionary battleground* to come into being (as a result of either a peasant revolt or of an outbreak of sharp anti-imperialist struggle).

It seems to us that in discussing the question of Soviet Power, especially when we are dealing not with propaganda and agitation, but, as in the case we are discussing, with a *slogan of action*, as to

how to proceed in practice to establish Soviet districts, we must bear in mind above all the *division of the colonial and semi-colonial countries into two types* as is done in the program of the Communist International.

True, the countries which Comrade Myro has in view are relegated by the program to the first group of countries which "have the rudiments of, and, in some cases, considerably developed industry . . ." and where, consequently, there is a proletariat which is able to give the bourgeois-democratic revolution *proletarian features.* But in dealing with the question of Soviet districts in the interior, Comrade Myro has in view not these countries as a whole, but special *national Indian* regions, and peasant regions at that. It is, however, well known that in Brazil, for instance, there is almost no Indian proletariat (in contradistinction to Peru and Bolivia, for example, where the majority of the miners are Indians). These national Indian districts are considerably nearer to the second group of colonial and semi-colonial countries as defined in the Comintern program, *viz.*, countries "where there are no wage workers or very few, where the majority of the population still live in tribal conditions, where survivals of primitive tribal forms still exist, where the national bourgeoisie is almost non-existent, where the primary role of foreign imperialism is that of military occupation. . . ." In these most backward colonial and semi-colonial countries "the struggle for national liberation is of central importance". (C. I. Program.)

It should be added to this that in the present instance we are faced with a most complicated *national* combination of circumstances where the Indian people are under the yoke not only of foreign imperialism, but of a great-power nation which is in power in Brazil. This additional factor of the national-oppression is clearly characterized for example by the American investigator Jefferson. "I think", writes Jefferson, "that the South American excludes his Indian fellow citizen from his understanding of nationality just as much as we [*i.e.*, the greater-powered Yankee—Li] exclude the Negro from our conception of the ideal American."*

Can we presume that the Indian toiling masses who live under these conditions are *today* already capable of rising to the struggle, under the slogan of Soviet Power (or under the slogan of peasants' Soviets, Soviets of Toilers about whom Lenin spoke at the Second Congress of the Comintern and which must be untiringly popularized in these countries as well), and of proceeding to establish a Soviet region in their own territories? Is it not more probable that an *anti-imperialist Indian peoples' revolutionary State after the type of the Mongolian peoples' republic* will be established in these national Indian districts as a result of a victorious national uprising? And if the Communists do not wish to isolate themselves from the Indian toiling masses among whom class contradictions are held down by remnants of tribal relations and the dual national yoke, should they

* Re-translated from the Russian collection of *Problems of Southern and Caribbean America*, p. 201. Published by the Institute of World Economics and Policy. Moscow.

not advance under the slogan of the establishment of an independent Indian Peoples' Revolutionary State? What is said here about Indian national regions also holds good for the remaining backward regions of central Asia, central Africa, etc., etc.

THE BROAD UNITED FRONT IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

But besides the necessity for drawing a distinction between the two types of colonial and dependent countries, it must also be borne in mind that under the present conditions of the maturing of the world revolutionary crisis, there is an expansion in the countries subjugated by imperialism, of the possibility *for establishing a broad united front in the national revolutionary movement.* Proof of this is to be found in the events in China and especially in Manchuria, where, in conditions of a plunderous onslaught by Japanese imperialism, an onslaught endangering what little remains of the national independence of the Chinese people and the very integrity of China, not only are the broad masses of the petty-bourgeoisie of the cities taking the road of the national-liberation struggle, but as the defense of Shanghai (1931) and the establishment of the buffer Government of Fukien (in the spring of 1934) show, certain sections of the officers of lower and middle rank in the Kuomintang army have also chosen this road of struggle.

At the same time, both during the events in Manchuria and during the defense of Shanghai, the relation of class forces, the degree of organization of the proletariat, and the support it received from the toiling masses of city and village, proved to be insufficient for the Communist Party of China to be able to issue a call for the immediate organization of Soviets. Under these conditions the Communist Party which never for a moment stopped its agitation for the Soviets as the only form of power capable of fulfilling the program of national and social liberation, issued the slogan (in Manchuria as well as in Shanghai) calling for the establishment of an anti-imperialist, peoples' revolutionary government.

The intensification of imperialist aggression and the sharpening of the forms it takes is not accidental. It follows consistently from the attempts of the finance capitalists of the imperialist countries to transfer the burden of the economic crisis onto the colonial countries; it follows from the sharpening of the imperialist struggle for a new division of markets.

It is, therefore, quite probable that a situation may be brought about in other colonial and semi-colonial countries when the *imperialist offensive* in one form or another (intervention, shooting down of mass demonstrations, etc., etc.), may *suddenly create a situation of national revolutionary crisis,* and may even raise very wide masses to armed struggle, to a *national revolutionary war* against imperialism, *against the will of the counter-revolutionary national reformist bourgeoisie. But at the same time the degree to which the proletariat itself is organized, the degree to which the toiling masses rally around the proletariat, and the level of their political consciousness, will still be insufficient at this moment for the Communist*

Party to be able to issue the call for the immediate establishment of a Soviet Government.

WHERE THE SLOGAN OF A NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY

In such a case, both in the colonies and semi-colonies where industry is relatively well developed, and where there are considerable numbers of workers, the slogan calling for the establishment of a *national revolutionary government* will be politically very appropriate. Such a government will be primarily *anti-imperialist, will be one of the forms of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,* or one transitory to it, as a government capable, if the Communists pursue a correct line, of developing into *Soviet* Power in the course of major class battles and by consolidating the leading role of the proletariat and developing the agrarian revolution.

Hence, the following conclusion must be drawn. In dealing with the question of the possibility of establishing revolutionary *place d'armes* in the semi-colonial countries, we should not, as Comrade Myro has done, link up the perspective of the development of such a *place d'armes* (battle ground) with the immediate organization of Soviet Power.

The concrete form assumed by this revolutionary power will depend upon many factors; upon the level of economic development of the given country, on the revolutionary traditions of the territory in which the rebellion has been victorious, on the extent to which the anti-imperialist movement is linked up with the agrarian-peasant revolution, and what is most important, upon the proletariat winning the leading role in the revolution and upon the strength of the Communist Party. In other words, it will depend upon a number of factors which cannot be forecast beforehand for all colonial and semi-colonial countries.

SECOND REMARK

Comrade Myro writes as follows about the conditions under which it is possible to establish inner Soviet districts:

> "*Firstly,* it is essential that at least in some regions in the country a situation of *revolutionary upsurge* [my emphasis—Li] should have developed which ensures that broad masses of toilers are rallied for the armed struggle for Soviet Power. Should there be an absence of sufficient revolutionary movement among the masses *if only in some regions in the country,* attempts at *armed uprisings* [my emphasis—Li] would be of a putschist and adventurist character, and would only lead to a useless expenditure of the revolutionary forces, and would compromise the very idea of the armed struggle for Soviet Power. *This,* however, *does not imply that the establishment of inner Soviet regions only become possible if there is an* all national *revolutionary crisis.* [My emphasis—Li] Herein precisely lie the special features of the situation in certain countries (primarily *semi-colonial coun-*

tries), where the State apparatus is shattered and unstable, namely, that here *it is possible* for the revolutionary classes to seize power in *certain* regions *prior* to it becoming directly possible for them to seize power on an *all national* scale."

To complete Comrade Myro's argument we must note that he considers the second condition to be that "a certain coordination should exist between the level attained by the upsurge of the working class movement and the level attained by that of the peasant movement." His third condition is that "the movement should be headed by a Communist Party sufficiently firm and able to carry on the struggle." We shall deal with these two conditions in the third remark we shall make.

We cannot, however, under any circumstances, agree with such a conception of the conditions under which it is possible to proceed to the establishment of Soviet districts, *i.e.*, an armed uprising even in a part of the territory of the country.

It is true that sharp points of contradiction between imperialist states and semi-colonial countries "*disorganizes the State apparatus and weakens its power to resist the revolutionary revolt of the masses of people*". The internecine war between the local bourgeois-landlords' cliques leads to the same consequences.

These peculiarities of the political situation in the semi-colonial countries make it *easier* for the revolutionary elements of the population to seize power, especially at the beginning over a section of the territory of the given country. This must not be ignored.

However, in estimating how far the situation is ripe for a victorious struggle for Soviets and Soviet districts, what must be borne in mind first and foremost is the *situation in the revolutionary camp* (and not only among the ruling classes, as Comrade Myro does). We must also bear in mind that where there is a serious danger that Soviet Power will be victorious, the imperialists, notwithstanding their contradictions, will render direct aid to the bourgeois-landlord counter-revolutionary forces.

In defending his thesis that it is sufficient if there is a "revolutionary upsurge" in part of the country for the armed uprising and struggle for Soviets to be successful, Comrade Myro can only refer to the *one* historical example of the establishment of *Soviet* districts, namely, to the example of China (the other numerous examples of revolutions in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in Turkey, Mexico, South and Central America, etc., by no means indicate the establishment of Soviets, but only characterize the "route taken by" or the "territorial division" of the fighting forces in *bourgeois revolutions* or peasant wars). But the experience of Soviet China is indisputable proof against his arguments.

Indeed, Soviets grew up in China not as Comrade Myro would have us believe, as a result merely of a "revolutionary upsurge" in "certain districts" while there was no "national crisis". The Soviets have grown in China in the *process of the revolution*, which has lasted several years in China and which prior to this passed through several stages. And it was only as a result of radical changes in the class

groupings and in the relation of class forces, as a result of the *proletariat gaining the leadership* of the movement, and liberating the peasantry from the influence of the national-bourgeoisie (who at the beginning participated in the movement and later became traitors and went over to the imperialists and feudalists) that it became possible to establish bases for Soviet Power and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The beginning of the establishment of these Soviet districts in the interior took place in a situation where there was a very deep revolutionary crisis on a national scale, where the whole of central and southern China were the scenes of a wave of revolutionary uprisings (the Nanchang uprising, and the advance of Ye-tin and Ho Lung, the miners' and peasants' uprising in Honan-Kiangsi in September, 1927, the establishment of Soviet districts in Heifing and Lo Fin in Guandung, and finally the Canton Commune). The Canton Commune was the completion of a whole series of heroic struggles of the retreating revolution. And at the same time it gave the banner of the Soviets to the new stage of the revolution.

In the period "between two waves of revolution" (see resolution of Sixth Congress, C. P. of China) *i.e.*, in 1928-1929, the small and weak bases of Soviet Power were able to maintain their existence not only because of the shattered state of the Kuomintang State apparatus, but primarily because a partisan peasant movement continued to rage throughout the south of China. The Soviets and the Red Army became a mighty force only in a situation where there was the new revolutionary crisis on a national scale which began at the end of 1929 and in the first months of 1930. The Soviets and the Red Army were one (but only one) of the factors in the maturing of this crisis. The other factors of this revolutionary crisis on a national scale were *first* the bankruptcy of the attempts of the Kuomintang to establish and consolidate a national-bourgeois centralized government on the basis of the temporary victory of counter-revolution (bankruptcy which found its expression in a new breakout of internecine war between the militarist cliques, in the collapse of the attempts to attract foreign capital, and in the complete failure of the whole of the internal policy of the Kuomintang, etc.). The *second* factor was the new wave of the working class movement when the working class assumed the role of leader of the new revolutionary upsurge.*

HOW THE SUN YAT-SEN GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED

It is well known that the total number of strikers in China was 750,000 in the year 1929, 730,000 in 1931, and 1,215,000 in 1932.

We might still allow that for the establishment of a basis for a revolutionary government and revolutionary army, a "revolutionary upsurge" would be sufficient at the stage of the united national-revolutionary front when the national bourgeoisie has come forward as one of the driving forces of the revolution. This, for example, was how the Canton government of Sun Yat-Sen was established in 1920

* See E.C.C.I. letter to the C.C. of the C.P. of China, December, 1929, where the presence of a revolutionary crisis on a national scale is admitted for the first time. (*Strategy and tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution.*) Russ. ed., p. 252.

and 1923. But this government (as distinct from a *Soviet* government) did not from the beginning come forward as an open enemy of the old social order, and of imperialism and the militarists. The Sun Yet-Sen government originated rather as a result of a *military coup*, and was for a long time dependent upon militarist forces (Sheng Tsuiming, Yan Sen, etc.) in Guandung until the famous revolutionary movement of "May 30th", 1925, and the Hongkong, Canton anti-imperialist strike which lasted a year and a half, events which laid the *beginning* for the Chinese *revolution*, supplied this government with the *broad mass basis of the revolutionary anti-imperialist movement.* But surely the period when the national-bourgeoisie in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (China, Turkey, etc.) participated in the revolution as one of its driving forces, is a matter of the past.

Can it be supposed that Soviet districts can arise, and, moreover, become consolidated as a result of such an unnoticed military coup (as the *formation* of the Canton Sun Yat-Sen government was), districts the formation of which will be taken by the imperialists, landlords, and national-bourgeoisie as an open challenge of their class rule? Can it be thought that the establishment of districts in the interior where the Soviet revolution is victorious will progress along lines similar to the establishment of revolutionary battle grounds in the *bourgeois revolutions* or *peasants' wars* of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, numerous examples of which Comrade Myro cites to support his assertions?

We emphasize further that in the question under discussion it is not a question of *spontaneous revolts*, but of the aim *consciously pursued by the Communist Party, i.e.*, the establishment of Soviet districts in the interior by means of an uprising on part of the territory of the given country.

The road to victory and the consolidation of the successes of the *Soviet* Revolution, undoubtedly contains *considerably more difficulties.* This is so because in this case in spite of the bourgeois-democratic character of the current stage of the revolution it is a question of a decisive step towards the complete abolition of all exploitation of man by man, whereas in the bourgeois revolutions it was simply a matter of changing one form of exploitation by another (or of doing away with foreign national oppression, and maintaining the entire old landlord-bourgeois order inside the country, the masses of which have risen to the national-liberation struggle). If this is so, then it is clear that the forces of the workers and peasants who have come forward in an organized manner under the leadership of the Communist Party, for *armed struggle* against imperialism and the landlord-bourgeois governments, *for Soviet Power*, must be adequately strong from the start, so as to achieve *even partial victory* in the sense of capturing power in one section of the territory of the given country, and utilizing this district as a jumping off ground for further rallying the forces of the revolution, and establishing organs of Soviet Power and detachments of the workers' and peasants' Red Army.

If the Communist Parties in the semi-colonial countries were to listen to the careless advice given by Comrade Myro and raise an armed rebellion with a view to organizing Soviet Power in a section of the territory of their country, while there is a revolutionary upsurge only in this part of the country, but while there is not only no revolutionary crisis on a national scale, but no general revolutionary upsurge throughout the country, then the armed forces established under these conditions will in all probability have to resort to the tactics of "permanent evacuation" (which Comrade Myro considers a *negative* example of what should not be done), tactics adopted by the Brazil rebels in 1924-1927 (the so-called "Prestes column") when the revolutionary army undertook an uninterrupted cavalry advance covering 25,000 kilometers, with the enemy at its heels and did not succeed in establishing any districts where the revolutionary movement was stable.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Hence the following conclusions:

1. In order to proceed to establish *Soviet districts* by organizing *armed uprising*, it is not sufficient that there is a revolutionary upsurge in a part of the territory of the semi-colony concerned. As a *general rule*, it is not sufficient if there is a revolutionary upsurge throughout the whole country. What is needed is that there should be a situation of *revolutionary crisis*. This by no means implies that a revolt becomes possible throughout the whole country, including its centers, where the power of the imperialists and bourgeoisie and landlords is strong. It simply means that *the newly formed Soviet districts will be able to receive immediate serious help from the mass movement in the territories occupied by the enemy during the first, most difficult "organizational" period.*

2. If the growth of the peasant movement leads to *a spontaneous movement of revolt* and to the formation of *partisan detachments* in the absence of a revolutionary crisis, *the Communists must certainly take the lead of this movement, consolidate it and attempt to spread it to new districts.* The advisability of undertaking the organization of Soviets in such a situation depends upon many factors (the degree to which the Communist Party and the proletariat have influence, the experience and class consciousness of the masses and the perspectives for the development of the movement, etc.), and cannot be foreseen beforehand. Our line of conduct in a situation where the superior forces of the enemy approach such a partisan district must be two-fold: if the Communists calculate on the maturing of the revolutionary crisis in the very near future, they take measures (at the same time avoiding a decisive clash with the enemy forces) to maintain these detachments as units of the newly formed revolutionary army by transferring them to other provinces, etc. Alternatively, if the territory covered by the movement is not extensive while the armed forces of the enemy are powerful, and if the general situation in the country does not give grounds for calculating on a rapid development of the revolutionary crisis, the Communists organize the withdrawal of these partisan detachments from battle.

THIRD REMARK

In dealing with the question of the conditions necessary and the steps to be taken to establish Soviet districts in semi-colonial countries, Comrade Myro does not deal with the question of the *hegemony of the proletariat* (as the *basic* political condition for the establishment of Soviet districts) or of the *Agrarian Peasant Revolution.* But it seems inconceivable to us that Soviet districts could be established in the interior regions of semi-colonial countries (as a general rule, not industrial but agrarian regions), and still less could they become consolidated in circumstances where there is no agrarian revolution, and where there is not a very sharp struggle of the peasantry taking place for the land, against the landowners, against the bourgeois-landowning State which protects the property rights of landowners. But if these two problems (the problem of winning the hegemony of the proletariat and the agrarian-peasant revolution) are left out of account, then the question will inevitably be left out of account of *isolating the bourgeois national-reformist parties from the masses, i.e.*, the basic force which prevents the masses from undertaking the revolutionary path of struggle and which attempts to hold the movement within the bounds of peaceful protest, within the bounds of the policy of "non-resistance" to imperialism, and the native feudal landlords, etc.

In his article Comrade Myro does not mention one word on this question. It is nevertheless obvious that it is impossible for the masses of workers and peasants to proceed to undertake armed struggle and the establishment of Soviets unless the national-reformist illusions that exist among the masses are seriously undermined and unless these masses are welded together under Communist leadership. When the question of the conditions necessary for and the steps to be taken to establish Soviet districts is dealt with without due consideration being given to these three mutually and indissolubly connected tasks, then it assumes a *narrow military-technical aspect.* But it is obvious that the military-technical elements of the preparation for an armed uprising and for the struggle to establish Soviet regions cannot be regarded apart from the political preparations which in the last analysis *decide* the success of the struggle.

So that our attitude may not be regarded as being without foundation, let us examine the arguments presented by Comrade Myro.

> "In the colonial and semi-colonial countries", says he, "the most important class battles have in the past, at least in the first stages of the revolutionary struggle, been fought out not so much in the capitals or other big centers as in outlying regions. The far-distant outlying regions have in many cases become the main base of support for armed uprisings. Prior to being victorious on a national scale, the revolution has embraced the outlying regions on the outskirts". (Emphasized by Comrade Myro—Li.)

To confirm this, Comrade Myro cites examples of the armed struggle of the North American colonists against Great Britain (1775-1783), the "Wars of Independence" of the South and Central Amer-

ican countries against Spain (1810-1826), the Teiping revolution in China (1850-1864), the Sepoy Rebellion in India (1857-1858), the Persian revolution (1908), the Rebellion of the Young Turks (1908), the Mexican revolution (1910), and the Kemalist revolution in Turkey (1919). One can agree with Comrade Myro that in all of the cases cited the forces of revolution in the "center" were weaker, and the forces of counter-revolution stronger than in the "outlying regions."

In all of the revolutions cited by Comrade Myro, the relation of forces was either a result of the fact that the *leading role* in the movement was played by the *national bourgeoisie* and the sections of the peasantry closest to it as well as by the army (as in the case of the war of the U. S. A. against Great Britain, the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, etc.), and their strongholds were in the interior of the countries concerned (whereas foreign occupation forces were concentrated in the coastal "centers", and the compradore (intermediary) capitalists were powerful and opposed to the national-revolutionary movement, or as a result of the fact that the movement was a *typical peasant war* (as, for example, the Teiping revolution).

It is obvious that the grouping and relation of class forces in contemporary *Soviet* bourgeois-democratic (anti-imperialist and agrarian) revolutions in the colonies and semi-colonies are absolutely different, and the examples quoted above can only serve as a lesson from the point of view of studying the possible "routes" to be taken by or the "territorial divisions" of the opposing forces. However, in the present epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the conditions under which such a "territorial division" of the fighting forces may originate, are absolutely different from what they were in the revolutions of the 19th and even the beginning of the 20th centuries.

Comrade Myro does not see this difference, when he enumerates all the above-mentioned bourgeois revolutions and proceeds directly to deal with the Soviet Revolution in China.

> "If, for instance", continues Comrade Myro, "we take the present (Soviet) stage of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in China, then it contains among other features, the following which are *characteristic* [my emphasis—Li] and which exert decisive influence on the 'geographic distribution' of the contending forces in China, *viz.*:
>
> "1. *A high level in the development of the peasant movement*, which assists in consolidating the forces of the revolution in the agrarian 'outlying districts' and which renders it easy to establish inner Soviet regions long before it becomes directly possible to overthrow the central counter-revolutionary government;
>
> "2. *The weakness of the Kuomintang state apparatus*, which has become more or less firmly consolidated with the aid of interested imperialist groupings in the most important industrial and cultural political centers, but which has not sufficient forces and means at its disposal to bring about real control of the 'depths' and 'outlying districts' where the revolutionary (Soviet) movement is developing."

THE ROLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

It must be noted here that neither the "high level in the development of the peasant movement" (as for example in Guandung during the Canton stage of the revolutionary movement), and the weakness of the militarist State apparatus did not and could not lead to the establishment of Soviet districts until the revolution took deep root and passed from the stage where there was a united revolutionary front to the stage of where there was an *agrarian revolution in which the proletariat exercised its undisputed hegemony.* The proletariat *prepared* this deepening of the revolution by means of colossal *anti-imperialist strikes,* by supporting the "Northern campaign", and by whole series of *armed uprisings* in the biggest centers, *viz.,* Shanghai and Canton. In the course of the revolution, the proletariat undermined the influence of the national bourgeoisie who had passed over to the imperialists and took the lead of the peasant movement. The proletariat supplied the most determined units of the Red Army (the miners of Pinsiang, the strikers of Hongkong and Canton, etc.), and as is well known the percentage of workers in the best units of the Red Army is from 25 per cent to 30 per cent. The vanguard of the proletariat—the Communist Party—rallied the scattered partisan detachments of the peasantry, organized them into a regular disciplined Red Army and gave the movement its *Soviet Form.*

Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviets arose and became consolidated in peasant districts, they were from the very beginning not peasant Soviets, but *workers'* and peasants' Soviets; a form of the *revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.* While taking into account the undisputed and colossal revolutionary importance of the peasantry in the Chinese Soviet revolution, it was only the proletariat who could ensure the victory of this revolution, the scope taken by it, and the power it has; and it is only the proletariat that can guarantee the prospects of the revolution developing in a non-capitalist, *i.e.,* socialist direction. The armed *peasant struggle could not have risen to a level higher than that of a partisan struggle, and have led to the establishment of Soviet districts, had the proletariat not won the leading role in this movement.* At the same time Comrade Myro totally ignores this *decisive* condition for the conquest of Soviet Power and the establishment of Soviet districts in the interior regions of the semi-colonies in his enumeration of the "characteristic features which exert decisive influence on the geographical distribution of the fighting forces in China". It is clear, however, that this question must determine the *political line* of the Communist Party, and the entire system of its *practical measures.*

But let us continue with our criticism of the arguments advanced by Comrade Myro.

In examining the conditions under which the establishment of Soviet districts in the interior is possible, Comrade Myro writes:

"*Secondly,* what is needed is that a certain coordination should exist between the *level attained by the upsurge* of the working class movement and the level attained by that of the peasant movement. Should the working class movement be very much behind, the estab-

lishment of a *firm proletarian core in the revolutionary insurgent army* would be very much hindered or would even be completely ruled out; the movement of revolt in such a case would be characterized by all the weaknesses inherent in a purely peasant movement (its scattered character, weak organization, etc.). On the other hand, should the peasant movement lag very much behind, and should broad masses of peasants be insufficiently prepared (if only in certain regions in the country) for armed struggle, the construction of a revolutionary insurgent army would generally speaking become impossible (for only peasants would constitute the main forces of the revolutionary army)."

Even in this, which is the *decisive* point in his argument, and where Comrade Myro should have elaborated on all necessary *political conditions* for the establishment of Soviet districts, he narrows down the question of the role of the proletariat to the *military-political* question of the establishment of a *proletarian kernel* in the revolutionary army, capable of guaranteeing that the army is organized and disciplined. "A certain proportion between the level of the upsurge of the worker and peasant movement" is a general formula which says nothing just as is the phrase about the "broad masses of peasants being insufficiently prepared . . . for armed struggle". What should have been said is the following: First, such a development of the peasant movement is needed as leads to a *sharp struggle for the land, to the agrarian revolution, to direct action of the peasants in seizing the landowners' estates and their distribution by the peasants.* It is precisely this struggle for land which more than anything else leads to the "masses being . . . prepared for armed struggle" and ensures the stability of Soviet districts. Second, such "co-relation" between the working class and peasant movements is required wherein the *proletariat* assumes the leading role in the movement and gives it its *proletarian features.* This refers not only to the army, but to all the measures taken by the revolutionary government and to the very form of this government (Soviets) and exerts its impression on the agrarian revolution itself, ensuring its consistent character and giving the entire movement a sharp anti-imperialist character, etc., etc.

COMRADE MYRO AND THE DISTRICTS MOST "FAVORABLE" FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET TERRITORIES

Let us now go a little further and examine what districts from the point of view of Comrade Myro are the most "favorable" for the establishment of Soviet territories.

Point 1. ". . . Those districts are the most favorable where broad sections of the population live under conditions of especially severe exploitation. Thus, for instance, in the South and Caribbean American countries these are primarily the regions mainly populated by Indian peasants."

Severe exploitation is, of course, an important factor. But we have already noted in our first remark that the political conditions which Comrade Myro quotes as an example, namely those in the

Indian districts, are least of all favorable for the establishment of *Soviet* districts.

Point 2. "It is highly advisable that a *peasant insurgent movement* should already be in existence in the districts where it is proposed to establish Soviet power." This is certainly desirable. But one must draw attention to the fact that we are again dealing here *exclusively with the peasant movement.* And let us recall that South China, where the Soviet movement began, was not only a district where there was a "partisan movement", but was a district which had great *revolutionary traditions*, and where revolutionary struggle had taken place in which all classes of the population participated. But here, for example, we have Manchuria, a district characterized by a partisan movement, and yet it was very far behind the level of the general movement precisely because the proletarian movement in Manchurian has always been exceptionally weak.

Point 3 speaks of the *extensive* character of the territory proposed for the organization of Soviet districts. We cannot but agree with this. It is, however, clear that this point, like the one that follows, is of special importance when it is a question of *maintaining* the power seized. We need only remark that the Soviet Revolution does not develop exactly according to plan.

Point 4 demands that Soviet districts should be established at a distance from the railways, and the coastline, so as to make it more difficult for the enemy to concentrate his forces.

Point 5 recommends that Soviet territory should be situated at a distance from districts where foreign interests are particularly strong (here again it is a question of *peasant* districts where there is no concentration in industry or plantations of foreign investments).

Point 6 presupposes the existence in the Soviet districts of an internal base for food supplies (in other words it is again a matter of agricultural districts).

And finally, *Point* 7 says that it is "desirable that in Soviet districts there should be at least the most primitive industry in the Soviet regions, to ensure that the arms in the possession of the revolutionary army could at least be repaired, if not actually manufactured, and that the means of transport could also be repaired, etc." Thus, in the last, seventh point, of Comrade Myro's "optimal plan" we finally meet with the proletariat! However, the proletariat is presented to us almost as medieval blacksmiths and gunsmiths!

"THE NORTHWESTERN THEORY"

We call to mind that in the stormy months of the summer of 1927 the then opportunistic leaders of the Communist Party of China, scared by the difficulties of the struggle against the imperialists and the hardships of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and landowners, brought into being their famous *"Northwestern Theory"*. According to this "Northwestern theory" the Chinese Communists were to concentrate their main forces in the districts of Shansi, Kangsu and Inner Mongolia which were also "extensive", "terrifically exploited", and at a great distance away from the railway, coastline

and large industrial centers where the interests of foreign capital are strong, etc.

The Communist Party of China *rejected this advice*, because it would mean weakening the work of the Communist Party in the more advanced districts to a considerable degree both economically and from the point of view of the development of *class contradictions and the class struggle* in these regions. And while now, *seven years later* (not in 1927, but in 1934) the province of Szechuan is, let us say, the most "optimal" for the development of Soviet districts, the Chinese Communists would, none the less, have made a fine business of it if they had directed their forces in 1927 towards Szechuan or still worse, the deserts of Inner Mongolia, leaving the Kuomintang to have their way in Central and South China. *The success of the Soviet movement was decided by the battles in Canton and Changsha, by the concentration of the work of the Communist Party in the industrial districts of Shanghai and Wuhan*, by the work of the Party among the *proletariat*. By its mass actions, strikes and uprisings in the towns under the very noses of the imperialists, the proletariat won its leading position in the movement, exposed the national bourgeoisie as traitors to the national-liberation struggle, isolated the "Left" Kuomintang elements and in all the so-called "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" (Tan Ping-Hsiang and others), freed the peasantry from the influence of the latter and thus ensured the establishment of a regular Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and stable Soviet districts in Kiangsi, Szechuan, in the "extensive" and "distant" districts. The agrarian-peasant revolution in its turn which developed over the extensive territories of Middle and Southern China ensured that the widest masses of the people participated in the movement, and hence that the struggle to retain their hold on the power seized and to *extend* the Soviet regions was a success. Comrade Myro directs the attention of the Communist Parties of the semi-colonies towards partisan struggle, towards peasant districts as the *center* of the entire activity of the Party, leaving out of account the *agrarian revolution*. Such a line of approach is fraught with the political danger *that the influence of the Party among the proletariat and the struggle for hegemony of the proletariat may be weakened.*

As if himself scared by the consequences of his "optimal" plan, Comrade Myro raises the question of *preparing* the struggle for the establishment of Soviet districts.

"The preparations of the struggle to establish inner Soviet regions", he writes, "presupposes first and foremost a general intensification of the work of the Communist Party, *especially* on the territory which is proposed as the basic *region of support* in the oncoming struggle". (Thus Comrade Myro again recommends that Party work be especially intensified in peasant regions, "far-distant" regions, etc.—Li.)

"Party work should primarily cover the *biggest* factories in the *most important* branches of industry, and also the *biggest* villages, plantations, etc." (It is only a pity that Comrade Myro has forgotten that his future Soviet regions there are only medieval smithies.—Li.)

"A mass struggle must be carried on for the partial demands, based on a very wide *united front*," (Against whom? Comrade Myro did not say a word on this question throughout his article.—Li.) while the treacherous role of the opponents of the Communist Party must be exposed in action, in practice, in the very course of the mass battles, and not only through wordy agitation, etc." (Once again—which opponents does he mean? Even here Comrade Myro does not place the question concretely, namely, first and foremost, *the struggle against the national-reformist bourgeoisie and their parties.*—Li).

"In brief, what is needed is that there should be an intensification of the development of the struggle to win over the majority of the working class and wide masses of toilers to the side of the Party. All these points constitute the main preconditions for a successful struggle to establish inner Soviet regions".

This is *all* about the *political* preparation of the struggle for Soviet districts, because after this the author deals with *military technique*. But what remains unclear is what is the basic prerequisite for the successful struggle for Soviet districts? Is it sufficient to conduct a struggle (which can last for a long time and be conducted with changing success) to win the majority of the working class to the side of the Communist Party (but this seems to be little), or must the Communist Party actually win over the majority of the working class? Is it necessary merely to conduct a struggle for the majority of the toilers, or again to actually win over the majority of the toilers to the side of the Communist Party? But if the last is referred to, then this seems to be too big a demand, and certainly it has not been achieved, for example, by the Communist Party of China, even at the present time. But there is not a word about the hegemony of the proletariat, about the isolation of the national reformists and about the agrarian revolution in the paragraph which deals with the political preparation of the struggle for Soviets.

CONCLUSION

1. In preparing and in the very process of the struggle for Soviet Power and Soviet districts *the center of gravity in the work of the Communist Party must remain work among the proletariat, in the large industrial centers.* The winning over of the majority of the working class by the Communist Party (measured not by election results, which don't take place in the semi-colonies, but by the Party's influence during strikes, demonstrations, etc.), is a necessary condition for the victorious struggle for Soviets. This does not mean that prior to the establishment of Soviet Power the urban proletariat in the colonial countries will be as well organized in mass organizations (trade unions, etc.), as for example is the case in western Europe. Such a degree of organization, as may be seen from the experience of the Chinese Revolution, will be achieved in the process of the armed struggle for the Soviets, and may extend over many years. However, the stronger the positions of the Communist Party among the proletariat are, the stronger the mass struggle of the proletariat in the major industrial centers and the more successful will the struggle

develop for Soviets and the more stable will the position of the Soviet districts be even if we do not succeed at the outset in establishing Soviet Power in the big cities occupied by imperialist troops.

2. The struggle for Soviet power (including the struggle in the *inner, i.e.*, peasant districts as a rule) demands that the proletariat win the *leading role in the movement.* It demands that the peasantry be liberated from the influence of the national reformist parties, and that the toiling masses abandon the road recommended by the national-reformists (*i.e.*, the road of compromise with the imperialists and the feudal elements), and take the path of revolutionary struggle. This leading role can only be won in the process of an armed, particularly partisan, struggle (as for example is shown by the experience of Manchuria). But a situation where *the Communist Party* has the *monopoly of the leadership* of the workers' and peasants' movement is the *necessary and most important condition* for the establishment of Soviets and the workers' and peasants' Red Army.

3. It is possible to proceed to establish Soviet districts in the interior when the peasants are engaged in a developed struggle for the land, under conditions of *agrarian revolution.* The establishment of Soviet Power must in its turn strengthen and extend the agrarian revolution. The closest contact of the anti-imperialist movement with the agrarian revolution guarantees the deep *popular character* of the movement and renders the Soviet movement invincible.

Such, in our opinion, are the basic political conditions for the victorious struggle to establish Soviet Power and Soviet districts in semi-colonial countries.

Against the "Conciliationist" Smugglers

By WILLIAM PIECK

(On Kurt Heinrich's Book, *The New Program of Social-Democracy*)

THE Communist Party of Germany is doing its utmost to establish the broadest united front with the Social-Democratic workers, functionaries and organizations. Through the medium of the united front, the C.P.G. wants to struggle, together with the Social-Democratic workers and their organizations, for better wages and better working conditions, against the fascist labor laws and against factory orders, against driving the youth out of the enterprises, against compulsory labor and against agricultural assistance! Together with them we want to fight against the terror of the Brown murderers, against an anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary war, and against an imperialist war. Every Social-Democratic worker and Social-Democratic Party functionary, every Social-Democratic organization, all who desire to struggle along with us for these aims, must be involved in the united front. At the present moment this is the immediate task of the German proletariat.

In the process of the united militant actions the broad masses of the Social-Democratic workers will convince themselves, thanks to our clear-cut Communist agitation, and on the basis of experiences acquired in the struggle, that the Communist Party alone shows the only correct road to the overthrow of Hitler fascism, and to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat—to the creation of a Soviet Germany. Thus, the united front is the prerequisite for rallying the majority of the German proletariat under the Communist leadership in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These efforts of the Party, directed towards the establishment of the united front, oblige us more than ever before to repulse decisively all open and masked attacks on the revolutionary principles of our Party. Precisely these efforts demand of us to sharpen our vigilance against all attempts to attack the revolutionary general line of the Party. One can see most clearly in the pamphlet of Kurt Heinrich how recently, among the "Conciliators", who say that they have long ago given up the struggle against the Party, hopes have been born to divert the Party along the line of Brandler and the conciliators. But the conciliators have miscalculated.

Heinrich, who for many years has been one of the leaders of the conciliators in the C.P.G., assures us that he sets himself the task to analyze in his book the discussion on the program of the Social-Democratic Party from a Communist point of view. It suffices, however, to read this book more or less attentively in order to see that Heinrich has used it to introduce conciliatory opinions. In this book the attempt is made, often openly and often in a masked form, to drag

in a "conciliatory" estimation of Social-Democracy past and present, the concilators' old malicious criticism of the Party leadership and the conciliationist estimation of the situation at the time of Hitler's advent to power.

A great part of Heinrich's book is devoted to the Miles group. Even this manner of casting his material is not accidental. The Miles group does not by any means play such a great role in the country as to merit so much attention. The attempt to reinforce Social-Democracy ideologically and organizationally cannot be undertaken chiefly on the basis of the Miles group. Heinrich asserts that the Miles group is a group of "mature social-fascism", and, at the same time, that the Prague Social-Democratic C.C. maintains a more radical position than this group. The political essence of such a distribution of the material in the book and of such an estimation of the Prague C.C. of the Social-Democratic Party is not to direct the main fire at the Prague Central Committee.

This intention demonstrates with absolute clarity Heinrich's assertion that Wels and Stampfer do not want to establish connections between the various Social-Democratic groups in the country. Speaking about the program issued by the Prague C.C. in January 1934, Heinrich declares:

> "We will show below that the new organizational scheme of the Social-Democratic Party—as it is understood by the C.C.—consciously places before itself the task to avoid creating a broad organization of Social-Democratic Party members, and not to establish connections between the individual groups."

The Prague C.C. of the Social-Democratic Party does not want to establish connections between the Social-Democratic groups within the country—can anyone think of anything more absurd? On the contrary! The Prague C.C. of the Social-Democratic Party, as well as the whole of the Second International, is doing its very best to establish connections with the individual Social-Democratic groups in the country in order to restore a centralized Social-Democratic Party. Experience has already shown us that where the Social-Democratic groups and organizations which only yesterday expressed a readiness to enter into negotiations for a united front with us, now under the influence of these endeavors of the Prague C.C., are declaring: let the higher-ups first come to an understanding!

It would be naive to suppose that Heinrich seriously thinks that the Prague C.C. of the Social-Democratic Party really does not want to establish connection between the Social Democratic groups within the country. Heinrich's statement is an attempt to dull the vigilance of the Party as regards these endeavors of the Prague C.C. This attempt follows directly from the attitude of the conciliators towards the S.P.G., as towards "an older brother" whom they do not want to hurt. Its source lies in the old Brandlerite and conciliatory liquidationist position towards our Party.

Heinrich delivers his attack on the Party leadership in a manner typical of the concilators, *i.e.*, foully and maliciously. He repeats the

Trotskyist-Brandlerite-Conciliationist slander: that the policy of the C.P.G. leadership hindered the united front action of the working class to avert fascism in Germany. In 1930-1931 when the fascist danger had developed, as well as after Hitler's coming to power, the C.P.G. defended and continues to defend the view that "Germany is not Italy"! This position is determined by a number of causes, including such facts that the relative stabilization of capitalism had come to an end; the C.P.G., being a revolutionary mass organization, now opposes fascism, an entirely different force than our brother Italian Party was able to place against fascism. But the conciliators and the Trotskyites come out jointly against this thesis and predict "a counter-revolutionary epoch"—an Italian perspective for Germany. In his book, Heinrich tries to attack the Party leadership in connection with this thesis, covering himself under "inoffensive" remarks:

> "Is there anyone who does not remember the leading articles appearing again and again in the *Forwards*, in which we were assured that Germany is not Italy. . . . ?"

This "reminiscence" is commented on by Heinrich as follows:

> "It is true that at that time the Social-Democratic workers did not understand that those who design for Germany such special conditions pursue a direct practical political purpose; to divert the workers from the struggle against fascism, to minimize the fascist danger and, above all, to prevent the united front action of the working class directed against fascism."

And so here, in the manner of the conciliationists, one says one thing, but has in mind another. Since Heinrich's book was printed in the "Prometheus" publishing house, the author could not attack the Party leadership openly. He carries out this task in a masked form, and because of that, more viciously. A direct attack on the Party leadership is carried out in Germany by other conciliators, who, illegally, distributed their anti-Party circulars.

Fritz Heckert's article, "What Is Happening in Germany", which appeared after Hitler's advent to power and contained a statement of the position of the C.P.G. on the question of the situation in Germany, is certainly known to Heinrich. In this article it is said:

> "German fascism cannot be compared with Italian fascism. Italian fascism came to power at the beginning of the period of capitalist stabilization, German fascism at the end of this period. Italian fascism crept in on the ebb of a revolutionary wave, whereas German fascism has come to power at a time when the wave of revolution is on the upsurge. Italian fascism was the fascism of a country victorious in the World War, it was a participant and executor of Versailles; whereas German fascism is an object of Versailles and has come into collision with ever growing international difficulties from the very first steps of its existence. Italian fascism came into being at a moment when the Versailles Treaty had fixed the stability of international relations for a number of years. German fascism comes into power at a moment when the Versailles system of relations is breaking up. The German proletariat is large in

> numbers. It has passed through the school of the proletarian revolution of 1918-19, which, although unsuccessful, was nevertheless a revolution. The German proletariat has formed the most powerful Communist Party after the C.P.S.U., a thing which the Italian proletariat did not possess after the split at Leghorn."

What was the situation in Germany the moment Hitler took power? The resolution of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. of April 1, 1933, points out that the economic and political situation in Germany had been exceptionally aggravated at that time, that the Communist Party had become a gigantic force in the ranks of the working class. The revolutionary crisis was ripening at a rapid pace while, on the other hand, in the camp of the ruling classes, deep contradictions had appeared. The governments of Papen and Schleicher showed themselves to be unable to hold back the growth of Communism. In order to defend itself, the proletariat would have had to resort to an armed uprising, and the working class would have fought on the barricades not for the Weimar republic, but for a Soviet Germany. But the peculiar features of the situation at the moment of Hitler's coup showed that the prerequisites for a victorious uprising had not yet ripened. And so in Germany in January-February 1933, there were the alternatives: either the proletarian dictatorship or the Hitler dictatorship.

The platform of the group of conciliators distributed in Germany polemizes against the estimation of the situations given by the C.I. and the C.P.G. In this platform it is said that not the question of "either a proletarian dictatorship or the Hitler dictatorship" but the struggle between bourgeois democracy and fascism was on the order of the day.

In this platform we read the following:

> "The Party leadership says that it was not possible to fight because the prerequisites did not exist for an armed uprising, *i.e.*, for the winning of power by the proletariat; and the Party leadership compares the situation in January with the famous thesis of Lenin about the prerequisites for the taking of power by the proletariat in Russia in 1917. Our Party leadership is right when it says that in January the armed uprising and the taking of power was not possible. But it thereby obviously replies to a question which was not called for, neither by the working class nor by history and which was prompted only by its illusions. . . . The working class was not in the position to conquer power."

According to the authors of the platform, the "historical question ripening in January" was not the question of armed uprising—the problem was *only* how "to avert the most extreme form of a counter-revolutionary victory: the fascist dictatorship". The question of whether one should have organized the armed uprising in January-February 1933, is, according to the conciliators—the authors of this platform—idle talk, because at that time the question was not one of establishing the proletarian dictatorship but of saving the Weimar republic.

In the resolution of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. of April 1, 1933, it is said:

> "The characteristic feature of the circumstances at the time of the Hitler coup was that these conditions for a victorious rising had not yet managed to mature at that moment. They only existed in an embryonic state.
>
> "As for the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, not wishing to slip into adventurism, it, of course, could not compensate for this missing factor by its own actions."

I will not go into a discussion with the conciliators on their conceptions. The point of view of the conciliators coincides exactly with the conception of Social-Democracy. In this connection I will say only this: Heinrich's book makes the same attempt to pass on to the reader the "conciliationist" platform. Speaking about Hitler's advent to power he says:

> "At the decisive moment in the struggle between democracy and fascism, the contradictions between the bourgeois factions were put aside and they all blessed the murderer's arms aimed at the working class."

The entire introduction of Heinrich's book is permeated with the idea that in Germany, early in 1933, there existed only the "struggle between democracy and fascism". But this is not true. Much more was involved, here the question involved was the struggle between the proletarian revolution and the open fascist dictatorship.

The old attitude of the conciliators and Brandlerites towards the C.P.G. and S.P.G.—an attitude of scornfulness towards the C.P.G., while, on the contrary, towards the S.P.G. an attitude of veneration is repeatedly displayed in Heinrich's book. In a special chapter he talks about "the rooting out of all the revolutionary traditions in the labor movement" by means of the Miles program. The chapter dealing with this question begins as follows:

> "In order to definitely weaken the proletariat, in order to deprive it of all faith in the possibility of solving its tasks, Miles must also disavow the history of the revolutionary labor movement. In order to drag in his social fascist ideology Miles must show that the proletariat of Germany never had a revolutionary Party and therefore no revolutionary traditions."

Miles undoubtedly had such intentions. It is true, however, that Miles denies that Social-Democracy was ever a real workers' party. But to counter-balance this, Heinrich would have been obliged to bring proof, in this chapter, showing that the German proletariat has a revolutionary party, that it has had already for a period of sixteen years the Communist Party of Germany. Nevertheless Heinrich absolutely "forgets" about the existence of the Communist Party and does not remember to say a single word about it. The revolutionary traditions of the German proletariat are first of all and chiefly in the sixteen years of struggle of the German Communist Party. Heinrich shows

typical Brandlerite-conciliationist disdain for the C.P.G. and veneration for the "old brother", the S.P.G.

The quotations cited by me from Heinrich's book show that we have to do here with a "conciliationist" attack on the C.P.G. As we well know, the Right opportunist views often match "Left" sectarian, "Left" opportunist views. This we see also in the book of Heinrich. It ends with several paragraphs in which the author intended to lay out the tasks and aims of the Communist Party for the near future. But what do we read here? Instead of struggle for the united front there is talk about unity in the C.P.G. The whole campaign for the united front is represented as a campaign for recruiting into the C.P.G. In the pamphlet we read the following:

> "The working class is moved by a deep desire for unity. The urge towards the common struggle in a united organization against the common enemy, against fascism, is becoming stronger. . . . The earnest desire of the Social-Democratic masses for unity in our class appears in numerous examples of masses joining the Communist Party. . . . This is a beginning. The Communist Party is determinedly marching along this path. Its aim is unity of action of the working class, unity in the German labor movement."

Here unity of action is represented as a campaign for recruiting into the C.P.G. But, unity of action does not place the condition on the Social-Democratic workers and functionaries, on the Social-Democratic groups and organizations to join the Communist Party. Only in the process of common militant actions will the broad masses of Social-Democratic workers come to the Communist Party. Thus the proposals in Heinrich's book amount to asking to begin the other way around. This road does not lead the German proletariat to common action.

At the very end of his book Heinrich speaks about the trade union question. He carefully avoids setting the task of re-establishing free trade unions as organizations based on the class struggle. He talks about "the building of trade unions and the creation of cadres of trade union representatives", but not about the re-establishment of the free trade unions.

By our slogan "restoration of free trade unions as organizations based on the class struggle" we respond to the mass tendency in the ranks of the German proletariat. In the course of many years, the working class of Germany, its class-conscious strata, built free trade unions with great efforts and with great sacrifices. The leaders of the free unions transformed these organizations into appendages of capitalist economy and of the capitalist State, thereby clearing the way for fascism. But among the broad masses of the German workers, who are organized in free trade unions, exists the strong will for the transformation of their organizations into organizations based on the class struggle and for using them in the struggle against capitalism. This urge has not disappeared with the coming of Hitler to power, it has been strengthened! Our task and duty is to utilize this will of the masses, to deepen it and strengthen it further.

Heinrich's book contains a violent Right opportunist attack on the general line of the Party and at the same time defends "Left" opportunist views. It is possible that we have to do here with a subtle literary attempt of the "conciliators" to establish contact with the "Left" sectarian elements of the Party in order to form a common front for the attack on the Communist Party of Germany. However that may be the Party will mercilessly smash the conciliators and their schemes. Greater vigilance in the struggle for the general line of the Party—this is demanded of us at the present moment!

In Memoriam I. I. Minkov

THE Presidium of the All-Union Society of Old Bolsheviks sorrowfully announces the death of a member of the Society, Comrade I. I. Minkov.

* * *

The Communist Party and Trade Union Committees of the employees of the Executive Committee of the Communist International sorrowfully announce the death of a co-worker of the Communist International and Old Bolshevik, Comrade I. I. Minkov.

THE LIFE STORY OF A BOLSHEVIK COMRADE I. I. MINKOV

On the eighth of February, after a protracted illness, Comrade I. I. Minkov passed away. In his death we lose an old Bolshevik and a firm proletarian revolutionary. He was born in 1894 in the town of Borisov, Minsk province. He was the son of a typesetter. In early childhood he moved with the family to the town of Dniepro-Petrovsk (formerly Ekaterinoslav) where he lived until 1910. He completed the primary school, studied for two years in a trade and industrial school. At the end of 1910 he went to Canada where he worked as a store clerk and then as a worker in different factories.

In 1911 he joined the "Russian Progressive Club" in the city of Winnipeg. In the spring of the same year, he joined the group of Russian Social-Democrats. He belonged to its Bolshevik section. From 1912 to 1913 he was secretary of the Russian section of the Canadian Socialist Party and a member of the Winnipeg Committee. In 1913 he was one of the organizers of the first May First demonstration ever held in the city of Winnipeg. He carried on active organizational, political and educational work among the Russian and Ukrainian immigrant workers as well as among the native Canadians. He actively participated in the collection of funds to assist the foreign and the Russian Bolshevik press, as well as to aid the political prisoners in Russia. He worked in the election campaign on behalf of the local Socialist organization. During the election campaign he came out against the corruption in the Provincial Parliament of Manitoba.

In the middle of 1915 he was forced to leave for the United States, to the city of Philadelphia. Soon after his arrival there he was elected secretary of the Russian section of the American Socialist Party as well as a member of the Socialist Party Committee in Philadelphia.

From the very outbreak of the World War he conducted very active work against those who took a patriotic stand, against the anarchists and the other petty-bourgeois trends. On instructions from the Russian section of the Party organization in Philadelphia he made a report at a Party conference on the question of the attitude of the American Socialist Party to America's entrance into the imperialist war. He presented a resolution drawn up by the Bolshevik section of the Party organization on the question of the attitude towards the

war and the tasks of the American Socialist Party. In 1916 he went to New York where he joined the editorial staff of *Novy Mir*, taking charge of the workers' correspondence department.

In July 1917 he returned to Russia and from the very first days conducted propaganda against the war and against the Provisional Government, in Vladivostok and along the way to Petrograd. In August 1917 he began to work in the Moscow Regional Committee of the R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks).

During the October days he carried out various fighting assignments from the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee. The Bolshevik work which Comrade Minkov carried on after that is briefly summed up in the following:

1917-18—Secretary Moscow Regional Committee R.S.-D.L.P. (B.).

1918-20—Secretary Moscow Provincial Committee R.C.P. (B), member Moscow Provincial Executive Committee and a member of its Presidium.

1921-22—Secretary Samara Provincial Committee C.P.S.U., member Samara Provincial Executive Committee and its Presidium.

1923-24—Candidate Central Control Commission C.P.S.U.

1925-27—Member Central Control Commission C.P.S.U.

1928-30—Did not work on account of illness.

In recent years, notwithstanding the fact that he was an invalid, Comrade Minkov worked very intensively in the Anglo-American Secretariat. In 1928 Comrade Minkov became a member of the Society of Old Bolsheviks, where he also worked very intensively when his health permitted.

Besides all that has been enumerated above, Comrade Minkov, before 1930, was a delegate to almost all the Party congresses and conferences and he was also a delegate to several congresses of the Soviets. From 1918 to 1924 he was a member of the C.E.C. of the R.S.F.S.R. Everywhere Comrade Minkov worked he worked energetically and faithfully and was always in the front ranks in the struggle for the general line of the Party and proved himself to be a real Bolshevik.

(Signed) PIATNITSKY, YAROSLAVSKY, BUBNOV, SHERMAN, ZELENSKY, SORIN, PORTER, YAKOVLEVA, MINGULIN, YANSON, SIROTA, MEHRING, TSIOTSIVODZE, LOZINOV, SOLOVIEV, MALISHEV, SLAVOTINSKAYA, OVSIANIKOV, GIBER, VOLIA, FEDOYEVA and others.

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